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Abstract
This thesis uses computational art practice to explore the question of indeterminacy
and uncertainty in contemporary societies. It explores the issues navigating through
different disciplines, starting from a preamble where the discoveries of quantum
mechanics are confronted with the vision of modern and contemporary empiricists
and re-articulated in post-structuralism and postmodernism. The approach from
physics and determinism moves towards one of the classic questions of philosophy,
that of free will. The state of indecision is described as the act of making a decision,
an act extended in time - eventually to infinity.
The reflection leads to the field of generative semiotics. Since the use of oracles to
make decisions is also a peculiarity of humans, the distance that articulated lan-
guage creates between reality and signs is proposed as a disruption that fosters the
dichotomy of instinct and rationality. In this fracture nature assumes the form of
the divine, whereas rationality is a procedural form. Technology, as an ultimate
expression of this rational form, surpasses humans in procedural decision making
capabilities, becoming a novel instrument to reach a divine union. Yet, early com-
puting showed that, to halt a process resolving an undecidable problem, a machine
has to receive an input of a different kind, an analog tape or an oracle as it were.
The interaction with a different substance - the analogue sensor or a supernatural
daemon - becomes the trigger to surpass a situation of impasse.
4
The question of uncertainty is then transduced into an art work that responds as
an intervention in that interdisciplinary space, materialising an aesthetic form that
draws on elements of the absurd and the aliatory in art, all re-interpreted in a do-
it-yourself hacker fashion, creating a peculiar noise drama that has the effect of a
symbolic ritual, or, ultimately, its seductive illusions.
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1. Preamble
Although apparently everything was known about the universe, there was always
something (about it) that remained inherently mysterious. The unknown resulted,
then, intrinsic and adjacent to knowledge and comprehension.
The question about uncertainty, the description of the real and its enigmas, starts
from a vision of the world without ruptures, a uniform structure understandable
by logic and dominated by meaningful relations. As if thought, that seems to be
related to the language of our consciousness1, was a permanent presence able to
make sense of the real, the imaginary, the symbolic, and the virtual2. This illusion
of comprehension, and the idea of a necessity and the determination of being, are
confronted with a continuous flux of sensations and perceptions that are very often
contradictory, inadequate and partial.
The necessity to share a common understanding of the world contributes to the
construction of an, eventually illusory, impression: if similar abstractions corre-
spond to similar phenomena, these phenomena must produce homologous percep-
tions. Nonetheless, the relation among stimulus and perception is not always linear,
and the presence of the one does not necessarily imply that of the other, or their
causal relation in a given time-space. The analysis of biological processes such as
1In the range from awareness to unconsciousness (range specified by the author).
2Potential included (clarification by the author).
6
Preamble
vision reveals diachronic and polytropic formations occurring at the intersection of
living entities and the environment. In fact, as Descartes reminded us, “the image
is a process - and a predicate – of the brain, not a property of the world represented”
(Descartes, 1664).
The human brain, through adaptation, turns around the pictures envisioned in order
to allow orientation in a three dimensional space. The dimensions perceived are
influenced by the senses and by a certain kind of use value which determines the
possibility of mechanical movement and the development of life and survival. Before
they can ever make sense of the world, men rotate it 180 degrees, and through the
organs of sense the world becomes image, and this image is transformed into (or
reconnected to) the idea of the thing itself. Although quasi instantaneous, this
process - that is a metaphysical but subjective cosmic movement3 – extends the
mental perception and reproduction of the world into the trajectory of time.
Practically speaking, in fact, there is a variable Δt4 (Clemence, 1948) which includes
the difference in time between the instant when the retinal formation happens,
the infinitesimal time necessary for the transformation of this image into electrical
signals, and the time used to stream these impulses to the brain for correction
and interpretation. Although apparently insignificant from a quantitative point of
view, this fragment of time brings up ontological questions of consistency, existence,
synchronicity, and, more in general, doubt.
3Before becoming percept, the image of every object of the real world turns around 180º in the
travel or transduction from the physical object to the eye, and other 180º in the transmission
from the eyes to the brain. Beside a difference in time, it is questioned and suggested here that
this movement implies further implications and transformations that invest the ontological
dimension of an object (argument by the author).
4ΔT or Delta T is the time difference obtained by subtracting one time scale from another, for
example the Universal Time (a time scale based on the Earth’s rotation which is irregular over
short periods) and Terrestrial Time (a theoretical uniform time scale); see Clemence (1948)
and Essen (1968). Here it refers to the hypothetical difference between Terrestrial Time and
Biological Time, or, in other words, the difference in time between external and internal to the
person. ΔT can also refer to the interval of time used in determining velocity.
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In fact, we tend to assume that what we see is present, material, it is form associated
to substance (matter); still, we cannot be sure that our representation of the real is
absolute. We can use different senses and their cross references to justify an idea of
normality and give consistency to our perceptions. We can observe a cup of coffee
on the table, assume the table exists and is there, we can see vapour over the coffee
and we presume the drink is hot, we can smell it and then we touch it. When we
finally drink this cup of coffee, we are reassured about its existence, and we know
- because we can confront our perceptions - that the smell and the taste belong to
the same substance.
Now the coffee isn’t there anymore whereas smell and taste are persisting in space
and time. We are awake, the night has come and we see the stars. We cannot touch
them; we know - because science told us - that what we see is just a delay, the stars
we see are historical information that has been travelling long years in the form of
light, so the image we see is just a projection, the impression of the past over the
present, and in the same instant the far away present which we cannot see may be
deducible in a very different constellation. So, what is, in this case, the difference
between a star and a cup of coffee?
It is a matter of time.
For example, if, paradoxically, we suppose or imagine that one day a difference in
speed would dilate the process of conversion of the image of the cup of coffee into
the idea of the cup of coffee, let’s say, of ten hours, then, by the time we know
there is some hot coffee on the table, and we see it steaming, we can be sure that,
while our slow synapses were interpreting the visual event coffee-cup, someone else
has drunk it, so the cup of coffee we see is not present anymore. Obviously, if this
change of speed would regard one sense and not the others, we could smell the coffee
without seeing it, and we could even grab an invisible cup, or, imagining a total a-
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synchronicity of perceptions, we may perceive the flavour of coffee a week after we
drank it.
In this sense, and according to this simple and explanatory logic, the materiality
of the world we perceive is influenced by time, and this implies that materiality is
incidental (in the sense that it belongs to the state of events), and not essential (as
an absolute property of matter), at least for us. There is always a fragment of time
between us and the reality we observe, so that we can perceive what we call the real
only in time, yet what we perceive is already past and doesn’t exist anymore, it’s
therefore unreal. Time creates a contradiction in the construction of the ontology
of the real: not only there is no future, even the present is a constant invention, a
continuous prediction of something approximately past. Reality appears, thus, as
fragmentary and incidental as any other immaterial, imaginary or hyper-real world.
If a scientific experiment can determine the position of a particle of matter only
in time, as trajectory, the individual empiric experience shows the opposite phe-
nomenon: comparing the self to the instrument of scientific inspection, and the
external world to a particle, we can say that in the latter case it is the time lapse,
or trajectory, that is uncertain, whereas the specific instant allows identification5,
of course in the form of representation.
Hume, in his ’An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ written in 1748, ex-
plains this subjective dependency on the senses:
... when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they
always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the exter-
nal objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing
5According to Simondon the individual subject is an effect, rather than a cause, of individuation
(Simondon, 1989). In antithesis and analogy with identification, which appears to be instan-
taneous, individuation manifests itself as a continuous generative process which has a different
relation to time (clarification by the author).
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but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white,
and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our percep-
tion, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our
presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It
preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation
of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
Hume (1748)
The author argues that what is present to the mind is not the table but its image,
as there is no immediate intercourse between mind and object. So the existences
that are present in the form of image to the mind are copies or representations of
other existences, which remain uniform and independent (Hume, 1748). Although
acknowledging the dependency of the object on the subject, the author seems to
believe in the idea of the existence of a uniform, consistent, consequent and inde-
pendent world; yet
. . . we have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself
but nature exposed to our method of questioning.
Heisenberg (1958)
Heisenberg affirms that the world described by classical physics, that rational system
responding to Newtonian mechanics and determined by causality6, was an incom-
plete and erroneous description: language leads in fact to contradiction, also because
of the tendency to ignore the influence of the instrument of inspection on the real-
ity observed. If in reality the transition - that is a temporal transition - from the
6F. S. C. Northrop, in his introduction to Heisenberg’s ’Physics and philosophy’ makes a distinc-
tion between two types of causality, which are often used without any declared distinction by
some physicists and philosophers: one has a stronger, teleological meaning and is synonymous
to deterministic, the other has a weaker meaning and is intended as mechanical causality. In
the latter acceptation of the word, every deterministic system is a causal system, but not every
causal system is deterministic (pag.11). Heisenberg uses the term in its strong meaning. In
quantum mechanics causality holds if it means mechanical causality but it is not valid in the
sense of determinism.
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“possible” to the “actual” takes place during the act of observation, it is impossible
to describe what happens in an atomic event, because
... the word “happens” can apply only to the observation, not to the
state of affairs between two observations. . . and we may say that the
transition from the “possible” to the “actual” takes place as soon as the
interaction of the object with the measuring device, and thereby with the
rest of the world, has come into play.
Heisenberg (1958:54)
After Maxwell unified phenomena such as electricity and magnetism around 1860,
Einstein’s theories of relativity modified the philosophy of modern physics by al-
tering the philosophical conception of space and time and their relation to matter.
Quantum mechanics brought change in the physicists’ epistemological theory of the
relation of the experimenter to the object of scientific knowledge, questioning the
understanding of reality and its theoretical definition. The concept of probability
or chance enters into the definition of the state of a physical system and its sub-
ject matter because the interpretation of the observation of a system can be stated
only in terms of a probability distribution concerning the position or momentum
of particles of the system. The particles of classical physics lose their fundamental
status dissolving into clouds of possibilities. In Newton’s or Einstein’s mechanics the
concept of probability and chance was operational, it subsisted only as verification
of what the scientist knows and it didn’t enter in the definition of the state of a me-
chanical system at any statical moment in principle. Quantum mechanics, especially
its Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy, has brought the concept of potentiality
back into physical science; he defines it as
. . . a quantitative version of the old concept of “potentia” in Aris-
totelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle be-
11
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tween the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical
reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.
Heisenberg (1958:41)
His philosophy of physics is, in this respect, closer to the metaphysics of Whitehead
(1929), who, recognising the world as organic rather than materialistic, substitutes
substance with ‘actual occasion’ and holds that nature is a structure of evolving
processes and reality is the process. Whereas in materialism nothing exists except
matter and its movements and modifications, in organic metaphysics reality is an
instantaneous process, a constant becoming distributed in a timeless duration. This
organic realism, where subjective forms complement eternal objects (or archetypal
forms), was proposed as a substitute for classical materialism. In organic material-
ism and its logic there is no such a thing as the opposition between material and
immaterial, because these two categories are not structuring a contrary relation;
they are, instead, complementary, and almost indistinguishable.
But why did scientists until the advent of theoretical quantum mechanics believe in
teleological causality and determinism? Why did Einstein, whose theories were also
revolutionary, severely object to quantum mechanics by saying: “God does not play
dice”?
In 1899 Max Planck discovered that physical action could not take any indiscrimi-
nate value; instead, it had to be some multiple of a very small quantity (Heisenberg,
1958:31). Planck’s constant is a number h referring to the quantum of action of
any object or system of objects. This quantum, which extends from matter and
electricity to light and to energy itself, represents the proportionality between the
momentum and the quantum wavelength of any particle. On a micro scale, when
the quantum numbers of the system being observed are small, the probability as-
sociated with the position-momentum in the state function becomes significant as
12
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consequently does the uncertainty specified by the principle. On a macro scale, when
the quantum numbers of a system are large, the probability numbers in the state
function – as well as the quantitative amount of uncertainty – can be neglected.
Thus, on the macro scale quantum mechanics converges with classical physics, or,
in other words, quantum physics with its mechanical causality gives rise, as a special
case of itself, to Newtonian and Einsteinian deterministic mechanics.
This inherent granularity of reality is counterintuitive and was never perceived be-
cause, in comparison to human experience, the quanta of action are very small. In
any system of observation the difference in information between macrostates and
microstates is called entropy7. Entropy in this acceptation means that every defi-
nition is an approximation, the erasure of a certain amount of information that is
defined excessive in order to reach an ordinate simplification.
But what exactly is the physical effective dimension? It is an intuitive
notion, which goes back to an archaic stage of Greek geometry, which
deserves to be remembered, elaborated and actualised. It refers to the re-
lation between ’figures’ and ’objects’: the first term denotes mathematical
idealisations, the second real data.
Mandelbrot (1975:14)
If objects can only become models when using a certain margin of approximation,
and their effective physical measure, and their real shape, can only be described
through observation, then reality appears to be subordinated to experience, and it
may be possible to draw Hume’s argument one step forward, and start doubting
about the existence of his very table, at least in terms of ontological singularity and
univocity.
7In signal processing this is called noise and can be explained as that which is considered irrelevant
or redundant. Noise, similarly to entropy, changes according to the degree of resolution applied
(Nørretranders, 1998:32,33)
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In classical physics science started from the belief – or one should say
from the illusion? - that we could describe the world or at least parts of
the world without any reference to ourselves.
Heisenberg (1958:55)
If all we know is subordinated to ourselves, the only possible description of the world
participates in our imperfection8. So how can humans have any certainty if all their
knowledge is subjective?
Nothing exists if it isn’t perceived9, and everything that is perceived includes a di-
mension of uncertainty that is both ontological and procedural. Science is not exact
because knowledge is subjected to human experience which is dynamic, momentary,
individual. Certainty may be defined as an illusion produced by the senses in order
to allow orientation in a multidimensional world. Reality can only be understood
through approximation, and its description is influenced by the degree of resolution
of the observer or system of observation.
Quantum theory and microphysics require a far more radical revision
of the idea of a continuous and predictable path. The quest for precision
is not limited by its cost, but by the very nature of matter. It is not true
that uncertainty (lack of control) decreases as accuracy goes up: it goes
up as well.
Lyotard (1979:55)
If a system is influenced by its point of access and investigation and by its internal
structure, and making any measurement of the initial state of a system requires a
8Imperfection here refers to the subjective limits of perceptions, it is not intended in moral sense,
rather it refers to human capability to make mistakes (clarification by the author).
9In the second chapter of “Immanence: A life” Deleuze reflects on Hume: if science is an enquiry,
theory is concerted to practice; ideas contain nothing but sensory impressions because relations
are external to their terms, an autonomous logic or relations. Causality is a special form of
relation and there is no error but delirium or illusion: when fantasy forges fictive causal chains,
beliefs, that are at the base of knowledge, are not false but illegitimate (Deleuze, 1995).
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certain energy, knowing that the description and the inherent uncertainty within
a system increases as accuracy grows, it may be assumed that the more a certain
system or situation is analysed, the more energy it is spent and the more confused
its comprehension becomes; while its meaning is vanishing, it won’t be possible
to operate any form of certain prediction over its future states, and its coherent
functioning will become increasingly mysterious and intrinsically undefinable.
15
2. Free will
The discoveries of quantum physics had a great influence on the imaginary of the
’citizens’ of late XX century and beyond. The introduction of the concept of un-
certainty propagated from the physical property of matter at a microscopic level, to
the existential condition of men, finally manifesting itself among the counter effects
and the properties of global capitalism. This immersion in the bath of insecurity
and parallel concomitant possibilities had eventually had an effect on the faculty of
choice. Making decision in a state of uncertainty or in a state of clarity implies, on
the grand scale of things, some assumptions on free will and autonomy of agency.
In fact, if humans have no free will, then there would be no real choice in the course
of their existence, and the act of making a decision would be just an impression,
a mere illusion. Else, the exercise of free will, the exercise of the faculty to desire
something rather than another thing, would be crucial in making a choice. Fur-
thermore, this immersion in the uncertainty frenzy would contagiously affect such
important predicate of mankind.
What is it, in fact, that one wills? How can one distinguish authentic voluntas from
the noisy influence of the social matrix and the superimposed desires that society
forges for us?
This story is about a search for “The Oracle Machine”, a supernatural machine
that flew to earth from the ultra cosmos of technology to resolve simple and com-
16
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plex problems that people were encountering at the beginning of the XXI century.
Apparently, at that time, due to incredible developments in science, physics, infor-
matics and engineering, the definition of reality and the position of the subject in its
respect were becoming increasingly uncertain. Machines were becoming more and
more perfect, confident, attractive, intelligent: they could learn from their mistakes
and, apparently, not only could they feel, they were also starting to become affective.
Moreover, people were increasingly delegating to technology important responsibili-
ties, and by adapting to this new mechanical and electronic world their senses were
becoming atrophic and their affective power was progressively reduced by collective
psychological anesthesia, prescription drugs and general panic. A form of depen-
dency between humans and machines was making people feel fragile, vulnerable, im-
perfect; the primogenial questions that were at the origin of knowledge, philosophy
and science, instead of being answered, were constantly disputed over the centuries;
one could have said that there was no progress in philosophy: the main questions
were still unanswered and the discussion was turning over and over again, finally
going back to the same points. But one could have also thought that at least science
was progressing, because its analytical or deductive methods implied proofs, exper-
iments and demonstrations... Yet that was another illusion, and science itself was
leading to territories of extreme contradictions and paradoxes: if on the one hand
technique, technology, although internally mysterious, were apparently functioning,
on the other hand the theoretical definitions of physics were hard to prove and even
harder to understand, and their ever more sophisticated findings were pointing to
abstruse multiplicity, ineffable infinity and shocking absurdity.
Hence the suffering.
Once upon a time the scholastic standard, derived by a Christian interpretation
of Aristotle (McGrade 2003), was imposed as a wall in front of the production of
17
Free will
any type of new knowledge. Later on, Kant idealised the grid into which you could
find the structure. In the meantime Galileo had suggested that the Earth was not
the center of the Universe, and, soon after1, the self occupied that vacant place2.
Nowadays both the intellectual oligarchy and amateur theorists think about (post)
structures, but comprehension requires imagination, and, if the utopian dream that
wished philosophers to become bureaucrats was realised in the dystopian world
dominated by ignorant businessmen, arrogant showmen and plastic dolls, what else
is hidden in this heavy luggage filled with culture? Can we find any answers that
can illuminate the path leading towards this marvellous machine we are searching?
And why is it so necessary to find it nowadays?
Let’s have a look...
If there is no objectivity and the knowledge of the world is influenced by observation,
reality is in direct relation with individuation and identity. Consequently a crisis in
identity can generate a crisis in reality, because reality is not given but depends on
experience. Reality is not ’a priori’, it is, rather, a percept. But if reality is a percept,
a mental impression of something perceived by the senses, and the subject is an effect
of the process of individuation, what allows the distinction between observing self
and observed world? If the perception of reality depends on the individual, and the
formation of the individual is an effect of the interrelation with the milieu, how can
reality be defined in terms of relations? If both self and reality are created through
the percept, they are in a relation of interdependency. It may be hypothesized that
– similarly to individuality – reality is also a transductional effect, an incomplete
coagulation (Simondon, 1964).
Although percepts preserve a tactile relation with the object perceived, there is
no synchronicity between subject and world because the process of transduction
1Soon in terms of history and cosmological transformations (clarification by the author).
2Paraphrasing existentialism and the dualism conscious vs non conscious (Sartre, 1964).
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develops in time and implies a certain difference, a time lapse – even if infinitesimal.
When reality is perceived, it is already past. Between subjects and objects of the
world there is a fragment of time precluding simultaneity. This fragment of time is
essential because it is in these fragments that reality and identity emerge. Yet subject
and reality remain a reservoir of potentials, some actualised, others metastable.
Then the formation of reality is influenced by the observer, yet the observer is an
effect of the process of individuation which is influenced by the milieu, so to say the
real world, which is part of reality. Are identity and reality, observed and observer,
constantly contained in one another like a matryoshka3, in a way that, according to
the distance between the two, or the grade of resolution, it is possible to find or lose
them in one another, in a repetition which reminds of the cyclic occurrence of form
in a fractal system or the continuum hypothesis?
If these formations dynamically influence each other and are in constant transforma-
tion, how can a subject make sense of the environment without necessarily making
sense of the self? And what preserves identity if subject and self are also unstable
systems?
According to Deleuze’s schematization of the plans of sensation, percepts are the
object of science because the process of perception begins with an object (stimu-
lus) that is transduced by the sensory organs into neural activity, whereas affects,
which are related to the unconscious or preconscious and lead to conscious emotions
through the process of becoming, are the object of art (Deleuze, 1981). Therefore,
while percepts preserve a stronger connection to the world, affects are closer to the
subject because they are an abstraction of the percept operated by the subject.
It is only through abstraction that a percept can become affect, in fact, although
3Does the environment, which is informed and completed by the emergency of the subject, influ-
ence the production of this reality perceived by the subject, if reality is the result of the subject
plus the environment?
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affects are independent and can be received by any subject, there cannot be af-
fects that are not generated by a subject. An instrument of observation can collect
data comparable to a percept, but can an instrument transform this data into an
affect? If nowadays research in bioinformatics is implementing methods to detect
human affects, can machines be programmed to create completely new abstractions
of percepts, so to say, synthetic affects? And can a normal person receive an affect
generated by a machine? Abstraction is one of the crucial problems that scientists
working in the field of Artificial Intelligence have to resolve.
Shaviro, in his online review of Simondon’s “L’individuation psychique et collective”4
writes that, according to the author, affects are mediating the actions of the subject
in the real world (Shaviro, 2006).
Paolo Fabbri5, reading Deleuze’s philosophy and his use of linguistics and semiotics
in the development of his aesthetic theories, affirms that every sign, being the ef-
fect of the action of a body over another body, provoking a variation of power, or
affective sensitivity, is therefore affect (Fabbri 1998). Thus affects can be signs, and
signs are never arbitrary. In the same essay titled “Come Deleuze ci fa segno” (How
Deleuze makes signs to us) the semiotician, delineating Deleuze’s method of defor-
mation and translation of different philosophical systems in his particular semiotics,
in opposition to semiology, writes:
... linguistic signs have always something to do with other signs, which
are natural signs; so that the opposition between conventionality and nat-
urality of signs is revoked by Deleuze, reader of Spinoza, with the idea
4L’individuation à la lumière des notions de Forme et d’Information (Individuation in the light
of the notions of Form and Information), published in two parts: L’individu et sa génèse
physico-biologique (Individuation and its physical-biological genesis) first published in 1964,
and L’individuation psychique et collective (Psychic and collective individuation) first published
in 1989.
5Paolo Fabbri, scholar and friend of Deleuze, in his lectures in Semiotics of Art at University of
Bologna, 1997/2002, often lingered over Deleuzian positions in art, aesthetics and signification.
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that there is no arbitrary sign [...] in other words, there is no reality of
any type outside signs, since signs are constitutive of objects and nomi-
native of events, then they are, themselves, the reality. 6
Fabbri (1998)
If the actions of the subject on the real world are mediated by affects and affects
are signs, agency is mediated by signs and, therefore, there is no distinction between
symbolic and real agency. Human agency is described as the capability of human
beings to make choices and impose those choices on the world. The difference
between agency and free will is that agency is not concerned with how humans
make decisions, while free will questions free act or its metaphysical determinism.
Spinoza’s position regarding free will is clear, and resonates in Peirce’s theory of
signs7:
In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined
to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another
cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.
Spinoza (1677: prop XLVIII)
Humans have no free will, and neither does God8 for the power of God is identical
to its essence and will is only moved by necessity: there is no volition or condition
to act.
... will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature,
but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like,
which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
6Translated by the author.
7In the distinction between object and interpretant and in their inferential relations, but also in
his synechism, Pierce outlined a philosophy of the continuum, where a sign reminds to another
sign, and so on to infinity. Similarly, Spinoza describes free will as a chain of causes which
determine one another up to infinity
8God is intended here in philosophical terms, for there is absolutely no religious belief or position
in this study (note by the author).
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and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.
Spinoza (1677: prop XXXII corollary II)
Apparently, the necessity of nature is the supreme power which regulates every
consequence, thus there is no will behind any action but a sequence of natural
consequences that deploy from one another; will becomes a form of natural motion
rather than a mental cognition, thus things happen by means of natural necessity
and there is no divine master plan or human mission.
Jean-Paul Sartre, just after the end of the Second World War, publishes a text in
which he analyses Descartes’ doctrine of free will.
Descartes, following the Stoics, provides a capital distinction between
liberty and potentiality [puissance]. To be free is not at all the possibility
to do whatever one wants, but to will what one can.
Sartre (1946:95)
But what if one cannot do anything? Is this a form of freedom? The freedom to will
nothing, the freedom not to move of an animal in a cage, the freedom of invalidity,
the freedom of those who don’t have a choice... Are they expressing their will by
accepting their unfreedom or by reacting to it9? Whereas Hume10 (Hume, 1748)
concluded that desire rather than reason governs human behaviour, in Descartes’
vision (Descartes, 1674) the intellect allows men, with its clarity, to act in conformity
with necessity11. Error is a bad use of free will, or the use of will before the intellect.
This position of Descartes is expanded by Spinoza (Spinoza, 1670), who negates the
existence of free will and holds that everything must be and happen, by means of
necessity, the way it does, and by Leibniz, who states that we live in the best possible
9In Descartes human freedom is limited by the possibility to will what God allows humans to will
(Descartes, 1674), and when this God doesn’t allow anything, freedom is nothing.
10Hume, 1748. An enquire concerning human understanding. Of liberty and necessity.
11Interpreted as God’s will (Sartre, 1946).
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world and God is unlimited whereas his human creations are limited both in wisdom
and power, and that limit predisposes them to wrong decisions, ineffective actions
and false belief. Although Leibniz admits that material objects, causation, space
and time are illusion, and substitutes the concept of causality, which is apparent,
with that of a pre-established harmony among everything ordained by an Alter
Entity, who doesn’t create but allows things to be actual, still the philosopher of
sufficient reason doesn’t want to deny the existence of free will and, to reconcile it
with the determinism of his theoretical system, proposes the view of compatibilism
between determinism and necessity, and, to reassign God this same freeness, defines
perfection, that informs the actual by supernatural choice, as determined by the
greatest quantity of essence. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz identify, as Sartre
suggests, the liberty of a being with the development of her essence.
Only centuries later, with the crisis of science and that of faith, the creative freeness
that Descartes attributed to the divine could be given back to humans, gifting them
with autonomy of action. Herbert Marcuse, in his ’A study on authority’ dated
1936, analyses the authority relationship. Authority contains a certain measure
of freedom (voluntariness: affirmation of the bearer of authority) and submission
to the authoritative will of the Other. In the authority relationship freedom and
unfreedom, autonomy and heteronomy are united in a single person, the self who
is the subject. The recognition of authority implies the surrender of autonomy. In
this study Marcuse12 observes the value of autonomy in the formation of bourgeois
philosophical theory, from Luther to Kant. To preserve the autonomy of the person,
the individual ceases to be considered a substance and becomes divisible. In this
dualistic mode of division, the internal of the person, the person as a ’thing in
12According the author the Christian-bourgeoise doctrine of freedom contains an anti-authoritarian
tendency because, when Luther and Calvin gave the Christian doctrine of freedom its decisive
form, bourgeois society was generating the emergency to conquer its right to exist in a dialectic
struggle with the existing authorities (Marcuse, 1936).
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itself’, as intelligible being in relation to Reason or God, becomes the realm of
freedom, meanwhile the external world, the person as a member of the ’external
world’, becomes the realm of unfreedom. These two realms are not contiguous or
superimposed, for freedom is - explains Marcuse - a condition for unfreedom. In
fact, only because man is free, he can be unfree,
... for the full freedom of man in the ’external’ world as well would
indeed simultaneously denote his complete liberation from God, his en-
slavement to Devil.
Marcuse (1936:8)
The unfree will is based on a power that cannot be eradicated because human nature
is attracted by disobedience, and this disobedience was chosen by committing the
original sin. This duality in the representation of the self in the Protestant-bourgeois
concept of freedom contains also another duality: the opposition between Reason
and Faith, rational and irrational factors.
... the bourgeois concept of freedom left the way open for the recognition
of certain metaphysical authorities and this recognition permits external
unfreedom to be perpetuated within the human soul.
Marcuse (1936:8)
How can humans still be responsible for themselves if their will is determined?
Calvinism reintroduces a concept of necessity that is not coercion but a ’spontaneous
necessity’, one which humans voluntarily accept.
... society’s material process of production has in many instances been
rationalized down to the last detail – but as a whole it remains ’irra-
tional’.
Marcuse (1936:11)
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According to Marcuse the bourgeois mentality, stigmatised by Calvinism, perpetu-
ated the dichotomy Reason and Faith, and its cascading paradigm of antagonisms,
structuring, on the one hand, a scientifically provable and mechanically engineered
world (of production), yet attributing, on the other hand, the origin of success to the
decision of a metaphysical authority, therefore situating it outside of human action.
Kant places freedom in the realm of the transcendental, far from the empirical and
intelligible world. Transcendental freedom follows a type of causality that stands in
opposition to causality in nature: it results from free actions and not from external
origins such as necessity and its causal factors. Freedom precedes any act for it is
eternal and a priori; it is never the result of liberation. Bergson attacked Kant’s idea
of a realm of freedom relegated outside of time and space and suggests that time is
homogeneous only when it is expressed in space, while most philosophers confused
time with its spatial representation:
The problem of freedom . . . has its origin in the illusion through which
we confuse succession and simultaneity, duration and extensity, quality
and quantity.
Bergson (1913:240)
Psychic states unfold in time and constitute Duration, and it is in their relation
to one another, in their multiplicity, that a certain unity is preserved, so that they
seem to determine one another. But this is just the immediate data of consciousness,
and if psychic phenomena are in themselves pure quality, or quantitative multiplicity,
because, if isolated from one another, they differ in intensity, and intensity is quality,
then, if their causes situated in space are quantity, quantity would, then, be the
sign of quality, which is a nonsense. Psychic phenomena are in fact quantity and
quality at the same time, and their extension in space is duration. Bergson’s idea of
simultaneity rejected the predominant mechanistic view of causality and predicated
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a novel space for free will to happen in autonomous and unpredictable ways. In
his interpretation, causality can only be reconstructed from the present looking
backwards towards the past: if causality is at the base of things, then future is
already contained in the present.
Deleuze in “Immanence: A life” defines a transcendental field as a sort of pre identity,
a pure stream of a-subjective consciusness, a qualitative duration of consciousness
without a self 13. The plane of the transcendental is an absolute immanence complete
in itself, neither in something nor belonging to something.
Consciousness becomes a fact only when a subject is produced at the
same time as its object, both being outside the field and appearing as
“transcendents”.
Deleuze (1995:26)
Therefore he distinguishes between virtuals and possible forms: ‘A life’ contains only
virtuals, and virtual is something that possesses reality and is engaged in a process
of actualisation following the plane that gives it its particular reality14. Possible
forms actualise and transform the virtuals into something transcendent while virtu-
als define the immanence of the transcendental field. Rather than observing a form
of temporal causality, Deleuze observes the behaviour of different strata including
the real but constituting also something else, that real that never became actual.
If there is anything unreal in temporal simultaneity it is outside the transcendental
field, because, according to this description, all that which is transcendental is fun-
damentally real. The power of will, then, may be traceable in the forces that drive
these ’geological’ formations and transformations of transcendental substance. This
process is the formation of reality and identity, subject and world; it implies the
generation of affects and signs. When the transcendental becomes immanent, when
13Deleuze (1995:25).
14Deleuze (1995:31).
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a particular reality is actualised, signs emerge out of this intersection. Signs always
contain something that is transcendental and something that is virtual; they always
imply essence and duration and the production of affect in relation to subjectivity.
Deleuze showed us that, not only signs act as mediators of any form of interaction
between self and reality: signs are the reality itself. Will can only access possible
forms; the question whether humans are free or reality is predetermined - and auto
determination is just an impression – remains open. Is it possible that the free will
we experience is just a special case of necessity, like causality is a special case of
quantum physics? Would therefore free will be potentiality?15
Luther’s division between external and internal freedom can be reproduced in the
dualism virtuality and potentiality, where potentiality is free will and virtuality is
necessity. Potentiality regards the interaction between subjects and reality, mean-
while virtuality concerns the relation between humans and God or Reason. When
free will differs from necessity, virtuality remains latent but still real. The mystic
and occultist Aleister Crowley, at the beginning of the XX century, in his esoteric
doctrines16 proposed the idea of a True Will that would reconcile free will and des-
tiny. According to this doctrine any individual, in the course of her life, has to
reconnect to an ideal self that is intended as the real identity that the person can
assume; to take this form, the person has to discover and exercise the True Will,
that will that is not imposed by culture or by any social contract, but comes from
this inner, possibly transcendental, identity of the person (Crowley, 1926). The
tension towards this will is a process of liberation from all that which is imposed
and confuses the person and the formation of the real identity; when this liberation
occurs, the True Will emerges as the only reasonable law, and the self assumes its
15Or are free will and necessity just two names for the same identical thing, like Hegel suggested?
(Hegel, 1816).
16Commentaries of the ‘Book of Law’. (Crowley, 1926).
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necessary form, allowing destiny to present itself. Yet, if True Will is predestined,
what liberty does it leave? Is freeness this adherence to an absolute form, or is it
a rebellious destruction and deviance from it? In this theory, that may be seen as
a form of idealism, the traditional hylomorphism17 is surpassed, there is no distinc-
tion between matter and form and free will and necessity become equivalent: in this
sense, each substance is substance of expression constituted of the planes of signifier
and signified; only in the path that subsumes will and necessity the self assumes
its predestined form. And in the course of their incomplete life, in the constant
flow of its duration, humans read and interpret the signs they encounter. In the
union of virtuality and potentiality they can synchronize to destiny and let the self
emerge in its necessary form. The continuous production and interpretation of signs
determined by the encounter of self and reality and their mutual and reciprocal
process of generation and transformation – which can also be called actualization of
both reality and the subject – forms an immanent structure which guides humans
in making decisions and imaging the future.
17Hylomorphism is the traditional cosmological doctrine, elaborated by Plato and Aristotle, af-
firming that every body is constituted of matter and form (Shields, 2010). Like matter and
form are the dimensions of substance, free will and necessity, in this comparison, can be the
dimensions of destiny.
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3. Indecision
This chapter will focus on indecision and its relation to uncertainty and undecid-
ability in the digital world of humans and the analogue world of machines. After
reasoning about signs (and their behavior in relation to perception, agency, choice
and free will), referring to various philosophical traditions, we will now look at the
world of logic and informatics that use signs to interpret, process and recreate the
real and the virtual.
During the last three centuries of the second millennium the field of logic went
through a period of intense development which brought about, in the middle of the
XX century, the invention of modern computers. The philosophical idea behind this
development was the intuition that logic could be used to produce new knowledge;
the technical challenge was the application of the rules and methods of arithmetic,
algebra and mathematics to natural language in order to find operational answers
to unanswered questions and, possibly, generate the exact and the beautiful through
procedures whose abstraction would secure their perfection. In the seventeenth cen-
tury there was an increasing trust in the idea that the universe could be reduced
to a single symbolic system and that nothing was accidental but everything fol-
lowed a plan and was determined and part of the same coherent discourse: Leibniz,
for example, was convinced that all aspects of the world, natural and supernatu-
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ral, were connected by relations of analogy1 which could be discovered by rational
means (Leibniz, 1714). The development of calculus laid the basis for the invention
of an operational language, or logic algebra, that would specify rules for the manip-
ulation of logical concepts in the manner that ordinary algebra specifies the rules
for manipulating numbers; a sort of ideal framework which Leibniz called calculus
ratiocinator. The invention of calculus favoured the development of experiments in
the field of physics which brought about the theories of electrodynamics and quan-
tum mechanics in the following centuries. Although every mathematician of note in
the seventeenth century contributed to the development of ’infinitesimal methods’
(Sondheimer & Rogerson, 1981), the discovery of calculus2 is usually attributed to
Newton and Leibniz in the period 1665-75. The paternity is shared because New-
ton’s work antedated that of Leibniz, but Leibniz was the first to publish and his
books had a greater and immediate influence on the mathematicians of the time.
The development of calculus was favoured by the spirit associated with the Renais-
sance which engendered a great attention towards classical knowledge in art and
science: editions of the work of Archimedes and other Greek mathematicians were
published and spread in Europe during the sixteenth century. Such books had stim-
ulated the development of theoretical mechanics which increased the use of machines
in early forms of industry; these machines required the elaboration of computational
methods that could give useful results even if the Archimedean standards of rigour
were abandoned3. The calculus was an operational method which was opening the
1In Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) a similar position is expressed in the
words “Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is transcendental.”
(Pag 78).
2Few important precursors are: Cavalieri, disciple of Galilei and professor at Bologna, who pub-
lished in 1635 the Geometria Indivisibilibus Continuorum; Fermat, who, beside solving simple
differential functions around 1630, developed analytic geometry independently of Descartes
and was, with Blaise Pascal, a founder of the mathematical theory of probability; Blaise Pascal
(123-62), who contributed to many branches of mathematics and built the earliest calculating
machine; the Dutchman Christiaan Huygens (1629-95), who created the wave theory of light.
3It was only after 1800 that Greek canons of rigour were reintroduced turning it from ’calculus’
into ’analysis’ (Sondheimer & Rogerson, 1981).
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possibility to find certain coherence of results even when the theoretical law under-
laying the operation was not clear and the results would at times be wrong; it was an
attempt to interpret the universe through experiments and quantitative inspection,
and the knowledge proposed was used for the creation of new – sometimes mechanic
– systems, and novel – sometimes esoteric - hypothesis.
In the XIX century the mathematician George Boole invented a system of symbolic
logic which subsumed Aristotle’s laws of logic and tried to practically implement
Leibniz’s belief4 in the use of mathematical symbolism for the generation of truthful
sentences and correct answers (Davies, 2001). Boole proposed that logical relation-
ships could be expressed as a kind of algebra and realised that what is significant
in logical reasoning is the class or collection of objects or individuals described
by the word in question. He also introduced the idea of secondary propositions,
propositions that assert relations between other propositions. In the second part of
the century Gottlob Frege sought a system of logic that included all of the deduc-
tive inferences of mathematical practice. Frege expanded Boole’s idea of secondary
proposition in the analysis of the structure of individual propositions and invented a
formal syntax. Georg Cantor, contemporary of Frege, developed a theory of number
in order to explore the field of infinite sets, accepting the paradox that, if for every
number there exists a corresponding even number which is its double, then the num-
ber of all numbers is not greater than the number of even numbers, thus the whole
is not greater than the part. Cantor’s research expanded mathematical knowledge
towards a field which humans hardly comprehend, that of infinity, and arrived to
declare that infinite sets come in at least two sizes, that is, the reality of a set is
not singular and its inherent immanence is not unique. Cantor introduced the term
transfinite numbers to indicate numbers that are larger than all finite numbers, and
4Although there is no evidence that Boole was aware of Leibniz’s work, it was nonetheless close
to it (M. Davies, 2001).
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his Continuum Hypothesis stated that there are no intermediate cardinal numbers
between Aleph-null, the first transfinite cardinal number, and the cardinality of the
continuum Aleph-one or, in other words, that there is no set of numbers between
the integers and real numbers. Kurt Gödel, Austrian logician, mathematician and
philosopher, in his paper named “On formally Undecidable propositions of Principia
Mathematica and related Systems” first publish in 1931 (In: Davis, 2004) affirmed
that the Continuum Hypothesis could not be disproved from the standard Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory (ZF)5 (Jech, 2011) even if the axiom of choice is adopted: its
proof of inconsistency was only showing that the axioms used cannot adequately
describe the universe of sets. In this famous paper Gödel [who was influenced, in
the development of his theories, by the meetings of the Vienna Circle, which he at-
tended since 1926,], using Georg Cantor’s diagonal method, demonstrated that the
property of a natural number being the code of a proposition provable in PM (Prin-
cipia Mathematica) is itself expressible in PM, because the proposition asserted to
be unprovable and the proposition making that assertion were one and the same.
With this demonstration Gödel proposed the existence of undecidable propositions
because of the paradox that provability in PM cannot be expressed in PM itself,
or, as the Polish philosopher Alfred Tarski6 put it, always in the early 1930s, one
can never deduce the truth of a system from within the system itself (Nørretranders,
1998:58). Gödel’s incompleteness theorem was revolutionary because it legitimated
uncertainty and undecidability within what used to be considered exact science.
Whereas undecidability affirms with certainty the impossibility to define the truth
of a statement within a certain condition, uncertainty does not depend on a system
or on a single statement and refers to the relation between what is known and any
5ZFC became the standard form of axiomatic set theory and is today the most common foundation
in mathematics (Russel & Norvig, 2003).
6Alfred Tarski (1901–1983) was a mathematician, logician and philosopher widely considered as
second only to Gödel among the logicians of the twentieth century (Gómez-Torrente, 2012)
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other information that is not present or available. The future, for example, is always
intrinsically uncertain, because, no matter how well things are planned beforehand,
there will alway be something occurring that was outside of any imagination. When
a set of knowledge has a relation of dependency with a set of non-knowledge, or un-
known information, then the knowledge possessed is uncertain. Since there is always
some information missing, due to the limits of humanity or the partiality of obser-
vation or due to entropy, then all knowledge is potentially uncertain. Indecision, on
the other hand, does not regard the world of objects but that of humans. Indecision
is the process of making a decision: every decision implies a moment of indecision,
that moment when the different cases are analysed. Indecision and decision making
can be extremely fast and dynamic but always imply a – sometimes infinitesimal
– fragment of time. Perhaps within this instant of stretched time reality, or many
realities, are ghostly appearances at the doors of perception, because in a fragment
of time many different potential realities are coexisting in uncertain spaces. In any
case, when this fragment of time increases in duration and a state becomes constant,
indecision is a condition. In such a condition the individual cannot act because, al-
though the answer or what to do is unknown, there is an emergent belief that there
is one thing that is the right, intrinsically right thing to do, and there is the idea
that, as long as there is a correct answer, there is also a wrong action or wrong
outcome which may happen in the case of a mistake7. The fear of this possible mis-
take generates and increases the decision time, also called, in artificial intelligence,
mixing time8 (Russel & Norvig, 2003), or indecision. In case it is believed that any
outcome is good, then there is no indecision unless there is an underlying trust in an
eventual best possible thing, that which is necessary or that which had to happen.
7See video interview in practical documentation (Dilemma01. xname, 2009).
8The mixing time is the time taken to reach a fixed point where the predicted distribution
converges, after which it remains constant for all time (Russel & Norvig, 2003).
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Since reality is determined and constructed within a point of view, intersection
between the self and the world, the self is part of the system observed. There are
apparently two problems: that of a language of description, or, as Wittgenstein
used to define it, the difficulty of speaking about language from within language
itself (Wittgenstein, 1921), and that of a point of view or measuring device. In any
case, individuation, producing the self, does not liberate it from any implication
with the world it is immersed in, because alterity, identity and reality belong to
the same system. Therefore, assuming there is necessity, what happens in case of
undecidability? Is it only from within the system that discerning is impossible? If
necessity exists, there cannot be an undecidable proposition, because there is always
something that was meant to be, the right thing to do. But what is the connection
between the truth of a statement and the right choice, and why should a decision
coincide with the right and the right with the truth? When a decision is a rational
process, the correctness of its assumptions, its syntactical coherence and the truth
of its statements should, apparently, assure that the decision is not erroneous.
But what is the right thing?
Is the right thing that which is necessary or that which is true? Is there an uncon-
ditional truth? Is destiny that which is necessary because it has to be or happen, or
anything that happens becomes destiny through its formation and the passage from
potentiality to actuality9? What margin of autonomy is left to humans? Is free will
generating their actions and their outcomes, or there is no choice? This question
lays at the origin of drama, the fight between self and necessity, will and destiny,
which is at the basis of the plot of Greek tragedy10.
9And from future or present or past? (Question by the author).
10From the Attic tragedy of V century a.c., considered the highest expression of Greek poetry
and art in the conjunction of the Apollinian and Dionysiac, emerges the awareness that every
possible action is a play with the unknown, which, in its separation from humanity, can take
the form of the divine (Nietzsche, 1872).
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Assuming there is no necessity nor predetermination but only autonomy, how are
humans with their free will dealing with undecidable questions, and aren’t all human
decisions an example of undecidability, since humans are always part of the reality
they observe? Are humans damned to uncertainty and indecision by the paradoxes
of logic and the intrinsic structure of the physical system they live in?
The fluctuatio animi that precedes resolute action is not a hesitation
between several objects, or even between several paths, but the mobile su-
perimposition of incompatible groups, groups that are alike but nonethe-
less disparate. Prior to action, the subject is firmly lodged between many
worlds, between many orders. Action is the discovery of the meaning
of this ’disparation’, of that by which the particularities of each set are
integrated in a richer, larger, set, one possessing a new dimension.
Simondon11 (1995: 207-09)
When a decision is made all the other possibilities (events, objects, etc) that were
present and potential before the decision was made are lost. This resolution can be
seen as a positive affirmation of the act of will or as the death and negation of all the
other possibilities that were not actualised. A recurring topological (from the Greek
τόpiος, "place", and λόγος, "study",Rocci, 1981Rocci (h ed)) situation generating
undecidability is one in which a subject has to decide where to be or whether to go
to a certain location or not. Different studies on animal’s behaviour show that also
among groups of animals collective decisions are often connected to what direction
the group should take, for example in case of migration (Conradt & Roper, 2005).
Traveling and changing location can be perceived either as death or as a rebirth, but
it is also a scenario in which these parallel possibilities become more evident and
close to perception. If the subject projects the self to the new destination, there is a
11Simondon here is quoted by Deleuze in a note of his review of Gilbert Simondon’s L’individu et
sa genèse physico-biologique published in France in 1966.
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feeling of newness, novelty, restart, whereas if the subject remains anchored to the
present location, yet has to move, the sensation emerging is that of loss, separation
between individual and setting, person and self. Potentially, an individual in a
fragile and unstable state finds balance in a form of repetition and predictability
that does not allow for change, identifying thus the self with the setting, as a form
of paradoxical metonymy - if we can consider the person as a part that is contained
in the setting.
Yet what is the role of intuition, for both humans and animals, in relation to decision
making? And is spontaneity connected to choice or is it automatic behaviour? What
is the impulse that generates action?
Perhaps intuition can be compared to a very fast processing of disparate informa-
tion, so fast that the act of deciding and analysing is not perceived. If a spontaneous
decision is based on intuition, according to this acceptation it is fast, and, therefore,
it isn’t perceived as a decision but as a self evident choice enacted by impulsive
and almost automatic behaviour. Henri Bergson, instead, defines intuition as a way
to comprehend the absolute, it is therefore the method of reaching knowledge in
metaphysics12 (Bergson, 1923). In this case, determined choice, and action, would
be guided by a comprehension of the absolute, whereas hesitation would be a sign
of distancing from metaphysics, or, alternatively, as a dispersion in the incommen-
surable, interpreting Hamlet’s behaviour (Shakespeare, 1623) as a paradigm of the
position of man in the century of the scientific revolution, where the kaleidoscopic
infinity of the Universe, perceived as that which is not the Self, throws the subject
into an inner abyss of paralysis and isolation.
Ultimately, in fact, why does it take so long for Hamlet to act?
12Is intuition coming from outside the system or does it participate in the system? Or both?
(Question by the author).
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The hero is in a trap: humans have become excessive (they are not anymore the
centre of the Universe), the order from cosmos to senseless infinite has lost its subject,
it is time for comprehension, and the Self disappears in the symbolic: universal
laws govern and describe relations and cosmic constitutions, language and social
structures. The point of subjectivity is lost: relations between elements exist beyond
the elements themselves.
Artificial Intelligence since its birth has been dealing with decision making. Classic
artificial intelligence defines a rational decision as the right thing to do, but its
interpretation of right and bad is not ethical but procedural: in informatics the
right thing is that which allows an agent to achieve a goal or an expected outcome
investing the smaller amount of resources.
Although computer science has developed a deep concern about relations, for exam-
ple in the use of classes of objects or databases, Spinoza’s conception of ethics as a
relative and relational value was never directly translated into computation. In fact,
there is no value or data type that is evaluated differently according to the other
values that are in relation to them, unless we interpret semantic web ontologies, or
Google ranking mechanics, as purely relational values, but this implies a different
interpretation of what a relation is.
The recurring dualism of Western Philosophy, instead, made its way, through logic,
into informatics, because all that which is digital can approximately be considered as
includible in the infinite array of combinations of zero and one, or electronic impulses.
The truth function of classical logic was translated in the Boolean logical operator
that defines the property of being true or false, and its application in traditional
AI, when dealing with uncertainty, is the implementation of the degree of belief:
the agent’s knowledge (of the world) can provide only an approximation that can
be dealt with through the tools of probability theory. In this vision knowledge
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is inherently subjective and imperfect, and uncertainty is accepted as a constant
property.
Successive developments in Artificial Intelligence proposed, attempting to reproduce
in machinic worlds patterns that were similar to those of organic life, another system
that could deal with approximate knowledge, a discipline called fuzzy logic. In 1965
Lotfi A. Zadeh’s proposed a theory of fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1965): surpassing the
binary ontology of traditional logic theory and extending its truth value to handle
the concept of partial truth, or degree of truth, fuzzy logic was born. If probability
provides a way of summarizing the uncertainty that comes from laziness (technical
term to define the impossibility, in terms of resources, to list the complete set of
antecedents or consequents needed to ensure and use an absolute rule) and ignorance
(theoretical and/or practical: either there are no rules and no complete theory to
describe a certain domain, or these rules haven’t been tested enough), fuzzy logic,
also called possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978), has proposed an ontology that allows
vagueness, ignorance and laziness: an event can be sort of truth, and vagueness and
uncertainty become orthogonal issues.
In fact, whereas in ordinary logic there are only truth-values, the fuzzy perspective
introduces an infinite number of values between perfect truth and perfect falsity,
which is called vagueness (Machina, 1976). Laziness, instead, indicates that too
much work, or procedural power, is necessary to know all the sets of antecedents and
consequent states necessary to ensure an exceptionless rule (Russel & Norvig, 1995).
In the art project at the background of this study these attributes are interpreted
as aesthetic and stylistic properties, rather than computational methods. In our
performances, for example, the term fuzzy embodies a form of composition. Fuzzy
logic is a method for reasoning with logical expressions describing membership in
fuzzy sets. Fuzzy set theory is a means of specifying how well an object satisfies
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a vague description. Fuzzy logic is therefore a truth-functional system; there is
no absolute truth in fuzzy logic. Since there isn’t an absolute reality either, and
perception categorises objects in vague descriptions, this type of logic seems to be
more natural and akin to human inner processes than geometrical truth. Fuzzy
predicates can also be given a probabilistic interpretation in terms of random sets –
that is, random variables whose possible values are sets of objects.
A Bayesian Network is a data structure used to represent dependencies among vari-
ables to give a concise specification of any full joint probability distribution. It is a
directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability infor-
mation (Russel & Norvig, 1995), which means that a number specifies the probability
that a certain direction of the graph would be taken if the schematisation applied
in the real world. These probabilistic graphical models represent a set of stochas-
tic variables and their conditional dependencies and relations via directed acyclic
graphs. Both the hybrid Bayesian network approach and the random sets approach
appear to capture aspects of fuzziness without introducing degrees of truth, and
this proves that the artificial world, compared to the organic, has abandoned the
utopia of a truth that could not be disregarded - maybe because machines don’t
care about the truth as a moral or ethical value? More recently, researchers have
come to understand the importance of complete knowledge bases – that is, knowl-
edge bases that, like Bayesian networks, define a unique joint distribution over all
possible worlds, worlds comparable to Deleuzian potential forms (Deleuze, 1995).
Methods for doing this have been based on probabilistic versions of logic program-
ming or semantic networks. Possibility theory was introduced to handle uncertainty
in fuzzy systems and has much in common with probability (Zadeh, 1978).
Agents in uncertain environments must be able to keep track of the current state of
the environment, just as logical agents must. A changing world is modelled using
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a random variable for each aspect of the world at each point in time. This random
variable is like analogue data from a sensor or an oracle as described by Alan Turing
(see Chapter 5). A Markov assumption (Markov, 1954) affirms that the current
state depends only on a finite history of previous states (Russel & Norvig, 1995).
Prediction is the task of computing the posterior distribution over the future state,
given all evidence to date. The time and space requirements for updating must be
constant if an agent with limited memory is to keep track of the state distribution
over a sequence of observations. The task of prediction can be seen simply as filter-
ing without the addiction of new evidence. This is the stationary distribution of the
Markov process defined by the transitional model. In practical terms, this fails in
predicting the actual state for a number of steps that is more than a small fraction
of the mixing time. The more uncertainty there is in the transitional model, the
shorter will be the mixing time and the more the future will be obscured. Smooth-
ing is the process of computing the distribution over past states given evidence up
to the present. This is similar to learning from experience. The key to the linear-
time algorithm is to record the results of forward filtering over the whole sequence.
The forward backward algorithm forms the backbone of the computational meth-
ods employed in many applications that deal with sequences of noisy observations.
There is a recursive, almost fractal, relationship between most likely paths to each
state Xt+1 and most likely paths to each state Xt. Filtering with continuous or
hybrid (discrete and continuous) networks generates state distributions whose rep-
resentation grows without bound over time (like the universe). A dynamic Bayesian
network is a Bayesian network that represents a temporal probability model. If an
agent is something that acts, a rational agent is one that acts so as to achieve the
best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome. In fact
the presence of uncertainty radically changes the way an agent makes decisions.
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A logical agent typically has a goal and executes any plan that is guaranteed to
achieve it. To make such choices, an agent must first have preferences between the
different possible outcomes of the various plans. Utility theory is used to represent
and reason with preferences. Preferences, as expressed by utilities, are combined
with probabilities in the general theory of rational decisions called decision theory13
(Lehmann, 1950), that combines probabilistic methods with a utility function, that
is representation of preferences in a given set or situation.
Uncertain relationships can often be characterised by so-called noisy logical rela-
tionships (Russel & Norvig, 1995). The standard example is the noisy-OR relation,
which is an abstraction of the logical OR (Shall I do this or that?). According to the
variable elimination algorithm, every variable that is not an ancestor of a query vari-
able or evidence variable is irrelevant to the query. A variable elimination algorithm
can therefore remove all these variables before evaluating the query, and this avoids
paranoia and repeated computation. Alpha-beta pruning is a search algorithm that
seeks to decrease nodes in a tree evaluating, when enough is known about a node,
whether that node will never be reached by any of the agents in a game, because
there are always better choices to be made. All the branches that cannot influence
the final decision are then pruned away (Russel & Norvig, 2010). Machines seem
to be better than humans in the practice of useless variables elimination, because,
in fact, an element that can paralise action and lead to paranoia is the confusion
between relevant and irrelevant facts, and the interpretation of eventually disparate
events as pertinent to the decision. ID3, which stands for Iterative Dichotomiser,
is an algorithm used to classify data. ID3, given a set of examples described by
several attributes or features, and a set of classes, tries to label each example with a
class. The classes themselves are not observable because they are high-level informa-
13Decision Theory = Probability Theory + Utility Theory. (Russel & Norvig, 2003)
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tion, whereas attributes are low level and can be observed. The correlation between
attributes and classes is not known before and has to be learned, but since each
attribute has little correlation with the classes, many of them have to be observed
(Quinlan, 1986).
There is a certain entropy in Artificial Intelligence’s methods to handle uncertainty:
to optimize a system, all the information that is not necessary needs to be discharged,
defining what knowledge is relevant in approaching what is not yet known. Another
element in common with philosophy and physics is the attention to time: time
always implies something that is not known, and the relation between past, present
and future is a structure where events are displaced. Artificial Intelligence, in trying
to develop techniques and machines that could become artificial life, has developed
the need to control, reinvent and simulate life. The world that AI’s machines and
entities experience is the same word that humans inhabit. These machines are
developing their own subjectivity and individuation processes and are able to be
formed and to form a world of objects named reality just like humans do. Now that
these machines – which have been inspired by biological models - rapidly improve
and move towards a perfection and precision that participates of otherness because
of its intrinsically non human state, time has come for humans to follow machine’s
example, and start learning from their experience in interacting with our world
because, in fact, machines are now part of society. Since humans and machines share
a form of uncertainty that is inherent to the physical properties of the real, whereas
they react to them using different methods and capabilities – for example, as briefly
exposed above, machines use their own graphical and logic forms of representation
and concatenation – the fact that machines and humans can support each other in
their mutual ongoing becoming is resulting everyday more evident.
Software, like any other instrument, came into existence with the aim of support-
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ing humans and their capabilities. There is a long tradition of software projects
developed in order to support humans in their orientation and decision making pro-
cesses. Logic Theorist, for example is a computer program written in 1955 and
1956 by Allen Newell, Herbert Simon and J.C. Shaw (Russel & Norvig, 2003) and
it is the first piece of software that was engineered to mimic the problem solving
skills of a human being; it is therefore considered the first artificial intelligence pro-
gram. Logic Theorist proved 38 of the first 52 theorems in Whitehead and Russel’s
’Principia Mathematica’, and found new and more elegant proofs for some. Its suc-
cess was followed up by the General Problem Solver, or GPS. This program was
designed to imitate human problem-solving protocols. GPS was the first program
to embody the thinking humanly approach14. Thanks to the success of GPS and
subsequent programs as models of cognition Newell and Simon embraced, renewing
it, the traditional belief that logic could create new thought, and formulated the
physical symbol system hypothesis, according to which a physical symbol system has
the necessary and sufficient means for intelligent action (Newell & Simon, 1976) .
Perhaps what they meant is that any system (human or machine) exhibiting intelli-
gence must operate by manipulating data structures composed of symbols and that
human though is a sort of symbol manipulation system.
John McCarthy, the American computer scientist who coined the term “Artificial
Intelligence” in 1955 and invented the Lisp programming language, published in
1958 a paper - probably the first ever written on logical AI - entitled “Programs with
Common Sense”, in which he described the Advice Taker, a hypothetical program
that is considered as the first complete AI system (Russel & Norvig, 2003). Logic
here is the method of representing information in computer memory and not just
14In Artificial Intelligence the ’thinking humanly approach’ is a cognitive modelling approach that
tries to determine how humans think in order to emulate the actual workings of human mind
in the design of software (Russel & Norvig, 1995).
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the subject matter of the program, and common sense reasoning ability is proposed
as the key to AI. There is a difference between common sense and best action:
common sense in fact does not necessarily indicate the best action at all but is
a prudent judgement based upon the experience that someone already has. The
best action is an abstract concept that is always theoretical because, if only one
action is performed, it’s impossible to define with certainty what would have been
the outcome of any other action. The imaginary program The Advice Taker was
designed so that it could accept new axioms in the normal course of operation,
thereby allowing it to learn and achieve competence in new areas without being
reprogrammed.
Today the path opened by The Advice Taker is continued by the discipline called
Machine Learning, an old branch of Artificial Intelligence currently rather hype,
concerned with the development and design of informatics systems and algorithms
that allow computers to evolve behaviours based on empirical data received from
databases or sensors (the machinic immediate data of consciousness). The advice
taker embodied the general principles of knowledge representation and reasoning:
that it is useful to have a formal, explicit representation of the world and the way
the actions of an agent affect the world so as to be able to manipulate these rep-
resentations with deductive processes, because a program has common sense if it
automatically deduces for itself a sufficiently wide class of immediate consequences
of anything it is told and what it already knows (McCarthy 1959:2). A formal rep-
resentation of the world and a symbol system that can allow the manipulation of
the world seem to be at the basis of both human and machine reasoning.
By reflecting on the programming of artificial agents and their activity in a real or
artificial world (robotics or informatics), and comparing some of the solutions and
theoretical frameworks of Artificial Intelligence to some of the references revised in
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this study, we propose that simulation can be used to produce theoretical concepts
and philosophy as it is already used to prove and formulate inductive and deductive
theories and laws by simulating scientific experiments (refer to the Indecisive Robot
described in the appendix [A.2. Robot, p. 95] as a potential example of simulation
for theoretical formulation).
In an unstable (and Boolean) mind indecision, in terms of truth or false fluctuation,
can become a constant state, so that every decision appears undecidable. In fact,
when humans don’t decide by instinct, moving to the plane of the transcendental,
but try to perform a rational decision, since they are part of the system they are
trying to analyse, the more accurate is the analysis of the situation and condition,
the longer the time implied in analysing it and the bigger the uncertainty resulting.
But, before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to
affirm and decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat,
the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not
the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given
thing.
Spinoza (1677:PROP. 48)
Spinoza differentiates between desire and faculty to distinguish between true or false,
a sort of capability of the human mind. Desire appears as a lower passion, probably
more corporeal, whereas the faculty to decide, the human will, resides in the mind,
and is operated by the intellect. Decision is driven by ethical principles of ontological
truth, with the assumption that there is something that is right and something that
is wrong.
Maybe indecision could be perceived as a state of grace, the pleasurable space of
non-existence where the singularity of the real and the self are not yet happening.
The grace of potentiality that belongs to the young and to the not in-formed, the
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potentiality of infinite events and multiplicity of identity... But in fact it becomes
fear, because it engenders the erasure of the self and the disappearance of subjectivity
(pre-subjectivity of Deleuze’s A Life) in a state of detachment from reality and time:
time is not passing and the self becomes transcendental. If humans could avoid pain,
enjoy the pure potentiality, the orgasmic multiplication of identity, the inherent
libido of the fragmentation of the self, the chasm of the dispersion of reality. . . But
“In such a situation, pain remains the only measure promising a certainty of insight”
(Jünger15, 1934: 47).
Jünger’s rejection of the liberal values of liberty and comfort is here translated in the
measure of pain as pure identification and a - possibly masochistic - psychological
and physical connection to the real. Not sacrifice as a virtue of man, or sign of a
religious pietas, but as an extreme quantity that awakens subjectivity and reconnects
individuality to the depth of substantial embodiment and, at the same time, to the
higher spheres of transhumanisation.
Beyond rationality and language, beyond position and momentum, beyond signs and
reality or the multiplication of possibilities and commodities, and the precariousness
and insecurity of working conditions, pain provides a certainty in the communication
between inside and outside, inner and outer, self and other, subject and world.
15Ernst Jünger, a writer whose celebration of certain elements of war made him popular among
right-wing nationalists, but who never openly adhere to the German National Socialist move-
ment, was also among the forerunners of magical realism. Throughout his life he had ex-
perimented with drugs, and some of his work is clearly influenced by his early experiments
with mescaline. He met several times with LSD inventor Albert Hofmann and they took LSD
together (Hofmann, 2013).
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4. Language
One of the dreams of the Oracle Machine was a special semiotic software, one which
could subsume two of the disciplines originated by logic, informatics and semiotics,
creating an antidote to some of the conditions that rationality had, over time, fos-
tered.
But what is semiotics, and what is its relation to language?
Every system of symbols, and every semi-symbolic system, presents a number of lay-
ers which structure its functioning. If symbolic systems are characterised by a form
of conformity that creates correspondences between units of expression and units of
meaning (content), and semi-symbolic systems present this structure of conformity
on the level of categories rather than on that of units, semiotic systems are char-
acterised by a non-conformity which appears enigmatic1 if a system of analysis is
not defined. The first two micro and macro worlds of signification offer appropriate
material for a system of comparison and its testing. Natural languages are, in a
sense, audiovisual systems, and the concept of symbolic and semi-symbolic systems
is not restricted to spoken or written language, but goes, rather, in the direction of
systems of notation and other logic apparatuses. Any existing set of symbols struc-
tured into a logic system presents a number of constant characteristics, so to say
1The terminology here used refers to that outlined by Greimas and Courtes in “Semiotics and
Language. An analytical dictionary.” (Greimas & Courtes, 1979) .
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discrete signs, syntax, grammar, and the procedural production of meaning. The
generative semiotics of the ’Paris School’, which is based on that linguistic tradition
originated by De Saussure and Hjemslev - and whose most representative member
is Algirdas Greimas (Greimas, 1970) - offers appropriate instruments to dissect a
symbolic system. According to the structuralist and generative hypothesis (to be
distinguished from Eco’s interpretative method), semiotics is the study of systems
and processes of signification. The fundamental postulate is that the signification of
a text2 can be articulated in different levels, from the most abstract to the concrete,
along the ’generative trajectory’. The generative trajectory can be compared to a
simple electronic system, or a mother board: passing through the circuit electricity
engenders events and is transformed by those, so that the output, in whatever form,
is different if detected at different sections of the circuit and the different cycles of
this circulation may not produce identical effects. In a simple wave-oscillator, the
sound will change when its output is moved, and electricity will be modulated and
influenced by the presence of this output. The circuit, in itself, doesn’t mean much:
it is only through moving electrons within its trajectory, thus giving an access point
(power) and an output (for example a speaker) that a composition of minimal el-
ements (sememes: resistors, condensers, a piece of wire) can speak. A circuit can
be thought of as a physical word: it is composed by minimal elements which don’t
mean anything per se’, but can generate expression if combined following certain
rules. Similarly to an inert circuit, a word that is written but not read by anyone
perhaps doesn’t generate any meaning.
Differently from the semiotics originated by Pierce3 and followed by Eco, which
2A text is here intended as a composition producing signification: in this sense, a film is a text,
an image is text, and a piece of music is also text.
3We are referring here to Pierce’s idea of a triadic structure of signs and the consequence of
infinite semiosis: if interpretants are to count as further signs, and signs are interpretant of
further signs, infinite chains of signs become conceptually necessary. But what happens to the
first and last sign of the chain? (Reflections by the author, following Paolo Fabbri’s “Visual
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resemble a sort of endless chain that arbitrarily connects interpretant to sign (and
so on), generative semiotics assumes that signifier and signified constantly influence
and deform each other, structuring an interdependent relation which is similar, and
maybe parallel, to that between observer and reality: both identity and signification
emerge out of the encounter of meaning and sign, or world and point of access to it.
Reality is not given in itself as a static and immutable array of objects, but it is a
coagulation effect given by the encounter of a subjectivity that perceives the world as
something other than the self, and in structuring this relation internal/external, the
reality that is constructed as internal representation, and the identity that functions
as an interface, or reflective liminality, are both marked by the pressure of these
intertwined spheres of influence, which affect and tend to resemble one another. As
well, the signified is not a “thing in itself” to which a signifier is pointing, because
the perception of an object is the transduction from external to internal, from object
to sign. And if perception is our point of access to the real, which is influenced and
constructed by the action of this sort of biological measuring device, then we can
see why, in a sense, signs are the reality itself.
Generative semiotics differs from linguistics, because its objects aren’t the elements
forming language but the actions that languages imply. For example, continuing
the previous similitude, linguistics would focus on graphical systems of notations for
the development of electronic circuits, while semiotics would look at their practical
functioning and mise en scène (this similitude is obviously valid as an explanatory
comparison which treats electronic components like a sort of alphabet, discover-
ing a double articulation in its structure). This may imply the potential for the
development of a semio-electronic discipline, which would focus on the process of
signification generated and instantiated by an electronic device, not only in terms of
Semiotics” lectures at the University of Bologna, 1998).
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human machine interaction, or conversation analysis, but as a discipline that would
also focus on the modalities that are engendered when an electronic device is active
and starts acting upon and communicating with the rest of the world (altro da sé)4.
The instruments of semiotics are useful to study not only the field of action in its
specific sense, rather that of the transformation and deviation of this action, follow-
ing a conception, at least for what semiotics of Greimasian influence is concerned
with, which interprets the act starting from its intrinsic strategic nature. According
to the semiotic perspective, every subject taking part in an interaction is composed
of different functions, which are progressively filled with different modal propositions
and values, that are ’will’, ’have to’, ’can’, ’know’, ’believe’, ’be’, and ’make’; such
modalities, inherited from linguistics, can constitute different combinations forming
a subject which can be described as a multiplicity of agents accomplishing different
plans of action. In this sense, subjectivity is not a compact and monolithic struc-
ture, because the stratification of the subject is constituted of different layers and
levels interweaving a dynamic balance, thus the interrelation among subjectivities is
interpreted by semiotics as a ’polemic’ exchange of fluctuating modalities that are
components of action. This polyphonic distribution of the subject may indicate two
things: first of all, singularity does not apply to human identity; second, hesitation
and indecision refer to complex states where the fluctuation of the different modal-
ities produces an overflow: there is no more memory, input and output are stuck,
too many procedures are running at the same time and action can’t take place. An-
other characteristic of generative semiotics is the attention towards oppositions: the
binary conception conceives the constitution of languages, up to the construction of
sense and signification, through differences: sense would not be given in any positive
and atomistic manner, but through disparity and relations among differences. Any
4In Italian in the text because in philosophical terms the Italian sentence, which mean “anything
that is not yourself”, is more clear and specific.
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value, or component, that constructs anything significant, would be given by the
difference in relation to another value.
Leibniz, in the extension of his doctoral thesis named ’Dissertazio de Arte Combina-
toria’ published in 1666 , suggests that all concepts are nothing but the combination
of a relatively small number of other concepts, and, developing Descartes’s idea of
an alphabet of human thought, underlines a very important distinction that needs
to be made when analysing combinatory systems, that is the distinction between
differences that are significant and those which are irrelevant (“capita variationum
utilium aut inutilium reperire”). In a system of signification differences can be more
or less conducive of sense. The Dutch physicist and horologist Christiaan Huygens,
also leading proponent of the light wave theory, in his ’Libellus de Ratiocinis in
Ludo Aleae’ (On Reasoning in Games of Chances), dated 1657, proposed a sys-
tematic study of occurrences in cards and dice games which laid the basis for the
development of probability theory. The comparison of symbols and the use of sys-
tems of symbols and their combinations for playing with and reasoning about reality
is an interesting practice that different sciences, games and pseudo sciences have in
common: from gambling to future prediction to statistics, official and esoteric knowl-
edge meet in the use of systems of symbols to speak about the real. According to
Jacques Lacan, language is that which distinguishes human and natural societies
(Lacan, 1957). It is with the appearance of language that the dimension of the
truth emerges, and the subject is fractured: in fact signifier and signified are not
on the same plane, and the unconscious, which is structured, like a language, of
discrete elements, is like the cryptogram of a lost language: it doesn’t have to be
decoded but deciphered because, like a rebus, it is language without code. The
unconscious is, then, signification without signifier, pure signification. Language
creates a trauma in the subject because the cogito is fractured in two (cogitans and
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cogitatum): in the relation subject/signifier the root of being is transformed because
identification includes the presence of an Alterity: the subject does not comprehend
itself because this pure signification happens outside consciousness while regards,
at the same time, the subject’s own identification. What Lacan calls ’depuration of
the transcendental subject’ (Lacan, 1957:511) is the transformation of the subject
into object (cogitatum), pure phenomenon.
If articulated language has so deeply transformed the existence of humans, animals
probably represent an antecedent state in which this traumatic fracture hasn’t hap-
pened as yet. Spinoza’s position in regards to animals is mutifaceted: on the one
hand, in fact, animals participate, like humans, in the divine; on the other hand they
can be used for the benefit of the human race. Since his “naturalization of human-
ity is such that neither language nor volition nor reason distinguishes him finally
from beasts” (Sharp, 2011), probably it is the lack of a specific metaphysical frontier
what makes Spinoza regularly insist on a presumed difference between humans and
animals.
Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not
consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in
a way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours....
Spinoza. Ethics, Pt. IV, Prop. XXXVII
Descartes, instead, bases his argument specifically on reason and volition, and, dis-
tinguishing in his ontology divine substance, res cogitans and res extensa, he sep-
arates humans from animals, situating them closer to in-animated objects. After
defining as free only what is voluntary, he asserts:
Regarding animals without reason, it is obvious that they are not free,
because they do not dispose of any faculty of auto-determination.
Descartes (1644:138)
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But reason, as opposed to instinct, is a child of language; thus, if reason descends
from language and freeness is an effect of reason, then freeness, or the faculty of
autodetermination, depends on language.
And what else can be identified as an evident property of reason?
Forgetting the question about the existence of the soul (in humans, animals and,
eventually, machines) - and the connected capability of will - and shifting paradigm5
to animal’s forms of communication, a completely different perspective unfolds. Is
it true, in fact, that animals don’t use language? Animal language is animals’
capability to communicate and express meaning; the process includes the encod-
ing and decoding of messages and the transferring of information among different
parts. Natural languages are characterised by a double register or articulation,
which means that sentences and complex structures of signification can be broken
down in meaningful elements (morphemes and words) composed in turn of smaller
phonemic elements which signify only in combination with other phonemes. Ani-
mal language doesn’t present this dual structure, and sound and behaviour are more
directly connected to meaning; in comparison to natural languages, they avoid addi-
tional layers of compression and fragmentation, sometimes creating onomatopoeias,
always structuring a strong direct relation between signifier and signified (Sebeok,
1968).
In general animals don’t talk about abstract concepts, their utterances are respond-
ing to external stimuli and, although a strong form of memory is obviously present,
they do refer to matters removed in space and time, but to a different degree if
compared with humans. Yet the question of a precise definition of this degree, as
5The question here is whether there is a correlation between double articulation and uncertainty
and doubt. To understand the connection between free will, thought and indecision and their
relation to articulated language, we look at animals to investigate whereas these domains differ
in a context where communication is not based on double articulation or, in case of exceptions,
where double articulation is not the norm (analysis by the author).
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to how remote their references can be, is undecidable, because it cannot be verified
within human language. Current research in animal culture and biosemiotics are
inspecting on the one hand forms of cultural learning through socially transmitted
behaviours, on the other the production and interpretation of signs in biological
realms (Sebeok, 2011). In the first case culture is interpreted as a process, in the
second the hypothesis is that, if the process of semiosis, which is the formation of
meaning through the interpretation of signs, is present within minimal biological el-
ements, it is then an immanent and intrinsic property of matter. The consequences
of this affirmation are opening new fields of exploration.
Human language is largely learned culturally, while animal communication systems
are mostly known by instinct6. In this sense, they intertwine an intrinsic relation
with nature. Humans may find animal language ambiguous when they try to in-
terpret it as a natural language having a double register; in fact the attempt to
decrypt a non codified message results in the failure of communication. Some cul-
tures consider humans substantially different from animals because of the capability
of thinking, and often the presence of thought is said to imply the presence of a
so called immortal and eventually immaterial soul, also called anima. It is difficult
to prove any of these assumptions because humans cannot demonstrate how their
thought or sentimental power differs from that of other animals. The forms of logic
that humans have created are not the only logic possible; communication always
implies a level of symbolism, and technique and the use of tools to extend natural
capabilities aren’t exclusive to humans.
Confronting the functioning of animal communication to a programming language,
and considering nature as equivalent to the machinic, animal communication may
6At the beginning of the XXI century progresses in zoosemiotics have demonstrated that animal
communication is more subtle and complex than previously believed (Sebeok, 2011)Sebeok
(2011).
54
Language
be compared to a low level language like assembler, closer to the machine nature,
whereas human language is high level and interpreted. In the context of program-
ming languages, low level means that a language is more machine understandable
than human readable. High-level programming languages are, on the other hand,
easier for people to comprehend, but they require an interpreter to be translated
to machine language. This renders the first type slower to execute then the second
(in fact there is a double substance of signification), but they are easier to learn.
Animal language is probably low level, which means that it is closer to nature and
not subsequently codified, thus less symbolic and more ambiguous for humans. Yet
both high and low level programming languages are compiled to a common base
level, whereas animal and human languages execution is substantially different.
Because of the tendency to structure various layers of interpretation between them
and the reality they observe, humans have implemented, over the centuries, the
tendency to interpret nature as if its elements were part of a coherent, symbolic
and linguistic discourse. The term apophenia, incorrectly attributed to Gestalt
psychologist Klaus Conrad (Conrad, 1958), indicates the human tendency to seek
patterns in nature, often interpreting as meaningful what is meaningless noise (if
noise is ever meaningless). This attitude to engender a process of de-codification of
data assigning to elements of reality a value which can acquire a specific meaning
within a relation among parts, building a model of the world based on relations,
can be reconnected to the structure of human language, which makes sense only
as a combinatory system. In any sense language influences our perception and
interpretation of the world. Reasoning about the use of language in the description
of reality and science, Heisenberg, quoting Weizsäcker, affirms that there may be
different levels of language:
One level refers to the object – for instance, to the atoms or the elec-
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trons. A second level refers to statements about objects. A third level
may refer to statements about statements about objects, etc.
Heisenberg (1958:182)
This would allow the structuring of different logical patterns at different levels, and,
as Weizsäcker suggests, classical logic may be a priori to quantum logic in the same
way as classical physics is to quantum theory. Quantum logic would then constitute
the general pattern, while classical logic would be contained into it as a special case.
Extending Heisenberg’s idea of layers and levels, what would be the position of
animal logic within this structure? And where can natural logic, which the theories
of biosemiotics are suggesting, be situated in this description?
If animal logic still implies the presence of an observer, natural logic is more complex
to be defined in these terms. Can Descartes’ vision of the world as a machine dreamt
by a God function as a metaphor of this reality in constant formation producing
meaning at any entropic level including its minimal terms? Or is human conscious-
ness validating this intrinsic a priori enunciative process that nature engenders?
Is reality in any case searching for a reassuring confirmation in the form of the
immaterial thought, or is matter real only when there is a relation of dependency
on the immaterial? How problematic is a definition of thought?
Thought, according to the British quantum physicist David Bohm, is a shared system
that has overdeveloped and is constantly producing problems while at the same time
tries to solve them, because, in fact, thought is part of the system and is not aware of
being the cause of its own sentence (Bohm, 1992). Wittgenstein7, in his Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, makes an attempt to draw the limits to the expression of
thought, because of the impossibility to compose any statement about the world as
7The author later repudiated this position, for example in the posthumous “On certainty”
(Wittgenstein, 1969).
56
Language
a whole. The boundaries of language indicate the boundaries of thought: language
leaves always out something that is inexpressible, and this is precisely the connection
between symbol and fact, which is the essence of logic and philosophy. The Oracle
Machine explores this differential function, oscillating between what can be thought
and the inexpressible.
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5. Oracles
The desire to create a mechanism able to solve everyday dilemmas was conceived
in 2004, under the name La macchina delle risposte, Italian for The machine that
gives answers, but its literal translation is The answering machine. The answering
machine is a special tape recorder commonly used in the recent past for answering
telephone calls and recording callers’ messages. Unlike voicemail, which can be
a centralised or networked system that performs a similar function, an answering
machine must be installed in the customer’s premises alongside – or incorporated
within – the customer’s telephone. It was originally invented in 1898 by Valdemar
Poulsen and was the first practical device used for recording telephone conversations.
Poulsen’s device, known as telegraphone, laid the foundation for the invention of
the answering machines used today, which was created in 1935 by Willy Müller
(Mercer, 2006). Landline telephones are nowadays collected as a curiosity and an
obsolete technology. They represent the first devices that allowed technologically
aided remote presence; their peculiar function creates a specific relation between
two places and two persons.
Old analogue landlines were very different from the diffused mobile communication
we use nowadays. First of all, there was a tactile analogue relation between the two
parts involved in communication because the conjunction of the parts was taking
place through a physical medium. Second, a number refers to a place rather than
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to a person, and it’s impossible to predict with certainty who will answer. Third,
in the past, when a phone was ringing, who was calling or what number the call
was coming from was unknown. Compared to current technology, the call was more
mysterious and less personal at the same time. The entire telephone conversation
used to take place in one room, and there was often a specific chair or a special posi-
tion that a person would assume during the conversation. The telephone stimulated
a strong identification with a particular place, which could be recalled to memory.
Entering in conversation with a determinate place was a way to step in a remote
room, listening to the sound of its environment – the traffic, the bell of a church,
a child crying, etcetera – and this process was able to articulate a technological
extension of the person’s presence. One of the results of mobile technology is the
creation of portable tools to mediate the access to reality at any given point, giving
their users the impression to be always at the same point. This effect is enforced
by the capillary attempt of multinationals to reconstruct all over the world iden-
tical facilities, camouflaging very diverse places into the same looking distributed
supermarket. Analogue landlines were establishing, in contrast, solemn locations
for sympathetic rites: there was a form of repetition that was creating a mediated
but tactile connection between two remote parts, and this ritual was taking place in
between spontaneity and formal act1. Each phone call used to start with a sequence
of actions that can be described as an algorithmic loop:
1There is always something spontaneous in a ritual (assertion by the author).
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if (no one is on the phone) && (there is enough privacy):
enter the room where the telephone is situated
sit in front of the phone
grab the phone handle
listen to the rhythmic sound of the free signal
focus on the person you are trying to contact
while you read, either from a book or from your own memory, the number of the
person you are looking for, focus on the image of the person
ask yourself: will she be there? Will he be happy to talk to me?
Look at yourself in a mirror, glass, or any other reflecting surface while tele-
transporting yourself to destination
for (i=0, I < n.length; i++)
insert your finger in the hole corresponding to the first number
turn to dial, listen to the sound that the machine produces
listen to the tone: if it sounds free:
if person_answering 6= person_searched:
ask for person_searched - start conversation;
else:
goto for;
There was a moment of silence, a reflection before attempting the call, and a num-
ber of preconditions were required (the number is available, no one else needs the
phone, etc). Contemporary telephony is faster and can happen in any place, so the
fetishism revolves around the object and not the space. A call can leave a trace
even if it is not answered (caller ID), and often phones discretely vibrate and do
not ring. Once upon a time the sound of the call was the start of a ritual: when
the sound would stop, there was a physical (not only communicative) contact be-
tween two remote parts. This physicality, this tactile relation between two people
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talking to each other through a landline is not present in contemporary mobile tele-
phony. The connection recalls to mind the two laws of sympathetic magic which
were propounded most clearly by Sir James Frazer in “The Golden Bough” (1890)
and Marcel Mauss in “A General Theory of Magic” (1903). They were proposed to
describe widespread magical practices and rituals in traditional cultures. According
to the first, the law of contagion, things that once were in contact with each other
may influence each other through transfer of some of their properties via an essence.
The second law, similarity, holds that things that resemble one another share fun-
damental properties. The remote contact that landlines offered used to create a real
time space for contagion and information interchange, and this extended auricular
touch used to stimulate another type of intimacy and interaction. Avital Ronell,
referring to Lacan’s four fundamental concepts2, writes:
Like transference, the telephone is given to us as effigy and as relation
to absence. At bottom, it asserts an originary nonpresence and alterity.
The self, when called into existence, comes to recognize an original self-
effacement. Responding to the opening of the first exteriority, the self is
prevented from being itself since the relation to the other is older than
selfhood.
Avital Ronell (1989: 84)
This relation to Alterity, which is older because an individual exists before the pro-
cess of identification takes place, embodies the opening of a dialogue with something
that can be either machinic or supernatural, and, while this Other interweaves an
a priori hierarchical relation to the Self and its absence, the absence gives space
to the unconscious to emerge, respond or ask. The telephone, medium for transfer
2The unconscious and repetition, Of the gaze as Object Petit a, The Transference and the drive,
The field of the Other and back to the transference (Ronell, 1989).
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and expression, through the transformation3 of individual speech into electric sig-
nal, becomes symbol of our schizophrenic relation to technology in the global world
and the dislocation and loss of contact with instinct and personal identity that this
synthetic ubiquity engenders.
The Oracle is an archetypal figure of human culture, and, like Husserl’s noemata
(Husserl, 1913), is a potentially existing or non-existing entity present to our mind.
An oracle (from latin oraculum) represents the response pronounced from a divinity
in reply to a human consultation. From the response, the word came to indicate
the place where the response was originally given. It constitutes a psychologically
and socially elevated form of divination. The purpose to create an Oracle as an art
project may seem bizarre on a first place, because the idea at the base is that humans
cannot make such machine, and the action may be outrageous and participate in that
very dangerous ὕβρις (arrogance) that was considered, among the ancient Greeks,
the sin of haughtiness, the disrespectful attempt of a human to stand in front of the
divine.
If we try to decompose in minimal components what an Oracle is, in very general
terms, we will, first of all, analyse the root of the word, which means in fact ’word’:
the relation to text is central; humans use oracles and humans have developed a
special method for communicating, they use in fact a symbolic language composed
of sounds, represented by letters, and the combination of groups of sounds to create
words, and the combination of words to create sentences, paragraphs, poems, books
and so on. This register, which may be remembered in one of those patterns that
Mandelbrot described (Mandelbrot, 1975), is rooted in the essence of humanity. We
have a number of subsequent encryption and decryption, and the natural approach to
communication of any new member of society goes through a series of complications
3From traditional shamanism to contemporary magic practices, metamorphosis has a special
position in the construction of the ritual act (Pinchbeck, 2003).
62
Oracles
before being called language, up to the capability of writing thoughts. Those logic
and symbolic systems are so connected to our education to be commonly considered
natural capabilities, although they are not dictated by instinct but by culture. If
the use of oracles is not absolutely dependent on the use of language, yet, as the
etymology of the word reminds us, it is a concept strictly connected to and originated
by language.
Humans are the only beings4 in the world who use languages with a double ar-
ticulation5 as well as oracles to call supernatural entities asking them support in
their decision-making. Since animals can show uncertain behaviour and doubt, and
they make collective decisions (Conradt & Roper, 2005), it cannot be affirmed that
they have no will. Thus, since the use of oracles is not a direct consequence of the
presence or absence of will, because animals don’t seem to be consulting oracles,
then, either there is a connection between the use of oracles and that of articulated
language, or the other entities that are apparently not using oracles are already in
a more direct connection with the divine (nature).
What emerges from the attitude to ask for answers outside the self, and also outside
the ontological status of humanity - because an oracle is an appeal or a question
asked to an element or entity of another kind – is a diffused sense of insecurity, con-
fusion of perceptions and the attitude to construct a meta-level of comprehension
where elements become signifying because their intrinsic and extrinsic relations are
4Although animals can display uncertain behaviour, apparently they don’t use oracles, unless they
do it through such a natural, intrinsic and spontaneous process, that the distinction between
them and this process is invisible, and their actions are automatically flowing in parallel with
nature, like hands are moving inside a clock. In ancient times the flight of birds was observed
as a sign to the divine, maybe because before a big storm, it is often possible to see birds
flying around nervously, and animals are said to perceive in advance earthquakes and natural
disasters: they appear somehow closer to nature, and more aware, although their system of
communication is simpler (reflections by the author).
5Beside recent studies (The Times, 2006) affirming that the spot-nosed monkeys (Cercopithecus
nictitans), as well as higher primates (Ouattara et al, 2009), can use syntax to build, through
discrete units of communication, sentences having specific meaning.
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considered relevant - as if composing a message inside a system which appears to
have a certain structure. A diffuse level of uncertainty is present whereas articu-
lated language is at use: the logic of language and science, which struggled towards
building structures of certainty, rationality and demonstrable paradigms and laws,
leads to an abyss of concomitant possibilities which renders logicians and their in-
struments tremendously fragile and metamorphic, because everything depends on
the perspective of the observer. The more precision is applied in observation, the
more reality shows its complexity and becomes slightly out of measurement; at the
same time, everything is to be interpreted and the process of interpretation itself is
constantly mastering the creation of an alternative reality which states its cohesion
and isolation.
Doubt, confusion and uncertainty appear to be a characteristic of humans, although
sometimes they can apply to animals and machines. In the case of humans its pres-
ence contributes to the development of an identity which has the tendency to appeal,
search for and trust entities imagined to be above the level of humanity, constructing
this way an imaginary structure of beings, which is hierarchic: humans are central,
animals are at the bottom and Gods are on top. This is a planar schema of a generic
structure of belief and it exemplifies the possibility to discover complex narratives
inside a two dimensional image. Another spatial and symbolic element inscribed
in such general grid is the structure, described by Zoroastrianism, where good is
situated on top in opposition to bad, that is situated at the bottom, like heaven
and hell (although this includes exceptions and differentiations at a iconographic
level). Another opposition is right and left. Maybe the use of language creates this,
eventually illusory, idea of an order, or grid, which is oriented and not reticular, hier-
archic but still relational: there are more animals than humans, more humans than
demons, more demons than Gods. This order is somehow governed and regulated,
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and, in the direction of the top, wisdom and justice are located. This structure is
dynamic: a man can become demon (see mythological heroes in Classic culture),
or a person can become a Saint (see Catholic tradition), or a famous person can
become a star (see contemporary pop culture). Moreover, men can behave as beasts
(see moral culture), and certain demons are half human and half animal (Centau-
rus, mermaids, monsters). The most interesting agents of this pyramidal structure
are those transforming metamorphic creatures sharing properties and predicates of
different substances and domains, entities that are half human and half god (angels,
demons, natural spirits), and all those acting as messengers, or mediators of com-
munication between different domains, i.e. priests, mediums, oracles and shamans.
Churches, temples, sacred and damned place, particular natural locations but also
theaters and any context adhibited to a performative or ritual act can be defined
as a non-informed meta-spaces which allow the circulation of such properties and
identities, favoring the occurrence of metamorphic events that can allow the unpre-
dictable to happen, generating forms of mimicry and communication that would be
elsewhere impossible. A performance transverses this dynamic structure producing
signification in the form of abstract representation.
Did the structure of language itself inspire our definitions and the subdivision of
objects of the world in classes and categories, or is it the chaotic and at the same
time coherent form of the real that left its mark on language and our perception of
it? These are objects belonging to different classes, where nature transcends into
the supernatural and the supernatural invests and emanates into nature.
The idea of a software device able to make and provide decisions for others suggests
a very complex machine that should be so supremely forged as to be able to per-
form and think and evaluate better than humans. The question if a human made
rational machine can reach the required perfection is nonetheless controversial, and
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the possibility of its development is at stake. In fact, if uncertainty is one of the
typical characteristics of humans, it is highly possible that, because of the transi-
tive property or because of contagion, this uncertainty would be transmitted to the
hand made machine. Moreover, the question whether a machine made of inert, non
organic matter can produce divination is problematic because divination requires
intuition, belief and interpretation. If divination is defined as being inspired by a
spirit, then the formulation may be the following: Can a spirit inspire a machine?
Or, as a variant of Deus ex Machina, can a Deus in Machina take place?
Can a machine be possessed6? How do we imagine the trance state of a machine?
The word machine derives from Latin ’machina’, whose original meaning is a de-
vice having moving parts that perform or assist in performing any type of work.
The advent of electronics has enlarged the traditional acceptation to include devices
without moving parts. Descartes compared the human body to a machine in virtue
of its material properties, whereas the mind was supposed to have immaterial prop-
erties (Descartes, 1664). This comparison left traces for a legitimate suspect: is
there a ghost in the machine? Is this materiality of the body-machine implying the
presence of its negation, the spiritual immaterial?7 Or, else, is there an independent
mind in the machine? And is this mind something that has spiritual properties? If
belief and interpretation can be simulated, and intuition can be described as fast
processing of data, the social interaction that these events require for the oracle to
happen cannot be injected into a single inert engine.
In Machinic Heterogenesis Félix Guattari (1992) proposes that machines are prelim-
inary to technique and cannot be interpreted as its mere expression. Guattari, after
6Possession here is intended as ’being inspired by a spirit or an entity other than human’ (speci-
fication by the author).
7A machine is a system that uses, creates and transforms energy, thus it implies movement and
flow (reflection by the author).
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distinguishing five main conceptions of machine8, proposes to go beyond the idea
of technical machine trying to put the accent on its singular power of enunciation
rather then on its vitalistic autonomy. Machines are composed of heterogeneous
levels that are material, cognitive, affective and social. They present different com-
ponents: the material and energetic; the semiotic, diagrammatic and algorithmic;
the components related to human body’s organs, influxes and wetware; the collective
and individual representations; the desiring machines which produce subjectivity;
the abstract machines with their transversal mechanism. Abstract machines are
transversal and dynamic and can put all the other levels in relation, assigning them
an ontological affirmation: this is the machinic concatenation that invests potential
and virtual fields.
In complexity and computability theory, an oracle machine is an abstract machine
used to study decision problems9. A Turing machine is a theoretical device that
manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules. Despite its
simplicity, a Turing machine can be adapted to simulate the logic of any computer
algorithm, and is particularly useful in establishing the logical condition for the
functions of a CPU inside a computer.
In mathematics most problems are problems of search, search of a scientific solution,
8Paraphrasing Guattari’s words, the mechanistic conception sees a machine as a construction
partes extra partes; the vitalistic interprets machines as living entities; cybernetics and Wiener’s
followers think that living beings are a special type of machine that can perform retroaction and
learn from experience; the systemic conception of Maturana and Varela is centred on the concept
of autopoiesis: only living machines can reproduce themselves; Heidegger and his followers give
a dangerous ontological base to the conception of techne: truth can be reached through the
exact. A similar assumption is somehow threatening new media art: if the substance of this
type of art is technology, and technology can be evaluated on the basis of its technical properties
(it works!), then new media art may be considered good when the technology composing it is
exact... Yet art is not supposed to be either exact or good.
9An abstract machine can be visualised as a Turing machine with a black box, called an oracle,
which is able to solve certain decision problems in a single operation. An oracle machine or
o-machine is a Turing a-machine that pauses its computation at state "o" while, to complete
its calculation, awaits the decision of the oracle — an unspecified external entity. This concept
is now actively used by mathematicians (Davies, 2001) .
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and the definition of the domain of this search in truth verification. A statement
is true until a case that contradicts it is found. Gödel had found that in every
theory T between the statement P and its negation non-P, there is always a gap
of uncertainty. In the statement “Every number < N is the sum of two primes” N
defines the domain where the statement applies. If N1 > N2 and in the domain of N2
the statement is true, then it is also true for the domain of N1. But what happens
if N=∞, so to say, if we are reasoning about infinity?
The supertask paradox (Stanford, 2012) questions whether machines can calculate
infinity in a given time (not in the continuous); if there is a system where each
machine can copy itself in two, so as to generate two machines that are smaller, and
thus faster, at each cycle the network of machines would become so much faster as
to be able to calculate infinity. But Quantum Mechanics disproves the supertask
soft experiment; in fact, if these machines become smaller and smaller, then they
may get to something that may be indivisible, such as a particle. But a machine is
a composed element, and if an electronic machine is not bound to having moving
parts, still a machine cannot be a particle, and if it was a particle then it would be
hard to know where it is, because of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty principle, and if you
know where it is maybe you don’t know when it was there. In any case, a too small
machine is no longer a machine.
Turing, trying to respond to Gödel, proposed a system of logic based on ordinals
in which the gap between P and not-P, where P is a proposition, is reduced by a
sequence of truth values that are P1, P2, P3 etc. In this infinite number of stages
there is no oscillation, but there is a limit to it, that is Pω (the infinite): this is what
Turing defines, for the first time, an oracle (Turing, 1939). In his later work, the
oracle machine becomes a Turing machine connected to an oracle. A Turing machine
is a hypothetical device that manipulates symbols on a strip of tape following a table
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of rules. Since they are mere mathematical abstractions, they benefit from the fact
they have no limitations on the amount of tape they can use (Davies, 2000). This
automatic machine helps computer scientists understand the limits of computation.
The infinite tape is marked into squares, and on each square there can be a symbol.
Passing through the machine, only one symbol is scanned at a time. The scanned
symbol can be altered, and it can influence the behaviour of the machine, but the
symbols printed elsewhere in the tape, but not being scanned, are not affecting it
(Turing, 1948). Turing was conceptually differentiating the concept of memory in a
electronic device in action and history: the scanned symbol would be processed in a
sort of Random Access Memory, where behaviour emerges, whereas the rest of the
tape is storage, information that can be accessed, but is not present at the moment
of computation. The oracle is an entity capable of solving decision problems, even
if they are not computable. It is not supposed to be a computer program, and its
alphabet can be different from that of the work tape. It has two special states: the
ASK state and the RESPONSE state. When the oracle is consulted, the content of
the query tape is replaced with by that of the response tape (Papadimitriou, 2003).
A machine with an oracle is a sort of hypercomputer, a machine that goes beyond
what a machine can do, because it can resolve the halting problem.
An oracle is a machine that can calculate infinity, or infinite divisibility. That’s why
in Turing’s later work the oracle becomes a different substance, the analogue tape
(Davies, 2001) . In the physical world the oracle could be a sensor, something that is
not algorithmic but gives input to an algorithm: an oracle is that which you cannot
formalize within a given system, therefore tending to infinity.
In the real world the Oracle Machine10 we have been searching for is not a technical
10The oracle, being another sort of entity, which has to be substantially different, is represented as
an analog external black box, and the opposition digital versus analog can be seen in parallel to
that of human versus machinic or supernatural, and the oracle becomes an operation between
different substances (reflection by the author).
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evolution, or simple software. The Oracle Machine is a ritual and social experiment,
and the machine itself is built of a combination of parts of different form, type and
substance. The Oracle Machine becomes a sort of Frankenstein: a monster com-
posed of different elements and actors that are not simply mechanical or electronic,
an organic and inorganic compound of elements which work together in order to
create a certain effect, and the question whether such effect is illusory, real or inci-
dental is of no importance. Containing software combined with human agents, the
Oracle machine is a collective experience which creates a synergy between symbolic
objects, a time-space situation, a software and a collection of digital devices work-
ing together in order to obtain and construct a certain effect, created by the flow of
collective energy in a ritual, theatrical and performative event. The machine’s com-
ponents trigger a circuit of energy which stimulates mixed substances and forces,
mere objects, symbols, software, and people. There is no oracle without human
presence, and there is no oracle without interpretation and language. The Oracle
Machine becomes a collective happening, in the form of an audiovisual stream.
The Oracle Machine, 2009. Performance, series 2/2
Inspired by this speculative model I held two performances in Brazil in July 2009, one
in Sao Paulo in the context of the Pure Data Convention and the other in Salvador
at Interatividade em Sistemas Computacionais Livres11. The performances were
simulating a moment of uncertainty, a subjective instant of undecidability, when a
person, the performer, immersed in a deep psychological isolation, yet in front of
the public, shows a moment of intense fragility, a fracture in the exercise of free will
and autonomy of action, finally instantiating a ritual of cathartic purification. The
performance staged a reaction: what to do to overcome the paralysis? Maybe talk to
11Visit festival url: http://iscl2009.wordpress.com/2009/05/04/gt1/
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someone, elaborate the problem, describe it, or even search for a solution. Better use
a telephone though, remote communication is less invasive, especially in a moment
of intense disarray. And who is it convenient to ask what to do? There’s nothing
better than an oracle to tell you what to do, so yeah, let’s ring a supernatural entity
and hear what they say12.
The main characters of these performances were software, hardware or human
agents. The symbolic objects, like fragments of an unconscious discourse, dissem-
inated a peculiar, fuzzy form of improvised narrative. The interaction was more
allusive than technical: an old telephone was the obsolete device used to contact the
oracle, while a sand-glass represented time and an old silver key the possibility to
open a passage to outer dimensions.
The reality of the event didn’t generate the exact but, rather, a form of subjective
perception. The software, implementing a simple combinatory algorithm upon a
small database of deconstructed sentences and words, human speech divided in
minimal elements, recomposed an eventually linguistic discourse by rendering the
second articulation a software operation (a detailed description of the performances
in appendix). This software intervention, introducing a form of Alterity - that is
the context which triggered the algorithm, transformed the result in the language
of otherness.
Alterity is the action of a different form or substance over the discourse, that act,
like Turing’s analogue tape, as a material link to infinity. It is this sense of infin-
ity, this quantum unknown or aleatoric action, that allows a form of transcension,
transcending the real or technology as it were.
If we cannot separate our brain from language, and we cannot separate language
from symbolic systems, then symbols appear to be intrinsically connected to our
12In italics are transcribed the author’s thoughts
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capability of thinking. Whereas the question whether computers can think is still
under discussion - although surpassed by the reality of simulation, neural networks
and gigantic databases - the idea of automated systems able to produce and generate
thought is an ancestral dream of humanity. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz in his
monograph ’Dissertatio de Arte Combintoria’ (Leibniz, 1666) described and analysed
in detail the idea of a special alphabet whose elements represented not sounds, but
concepts. His aim was to create a system in which symbols could magically produce
correct answers to problems almost unaided. The conception of such a machine
compares the functioning of a denotation structure - such as that of traditional
Western music - with the production of concepts and spoken language through the
use of logic, and of logic through the use of language. Music exists before any system
to write and remember it, but the denotation method inspires the creation of other
music. When we think of natural languages, we can say that logic is both a set of
rules which allow language to make sense (grammar, syntax, logic), and that the
elaboration of language through these rules produces other and more knowledge.
Leibniz’s machine (Liebniz, 1666) indirectly compares music to thought, and, by
seeking to define what level of fragmentation is necessary in identifying minimal
grammatical elements, and what process is behind the elaboration of concepts, he
asserted two main hypothesis: the first is that beauty (harmony) is composed, in a
formal and ethical sense, of a certain structure drawn by a certain process (the right
answer is ethically beautiful). The second is that a machine has more abilities than
humans; in fact, not only should the machine compose thought, it is supposed to give
the correct answer even to unsolvable problems. The language of a machine which
can tell the truth participates of that other-languagedness which Bakhtin considers
at the base of polyglossia, explained as the use and reuse of someone else’s words to
make and speak any new sentence.
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For the creating literary consciousness, existing in a field illuminated
by another’s language, it is not the phonetic system of its own language
that stands out, nor it is the distinctive features of its own morphology
nor its own abstract lexicon - what stands out is precisely that which
makes language concrete and which makes its world view ultimately un-
translatable, that is, precisely, the style of the language as a totality ...
Bakhtin (1975)
Identity and language do not belong merely to the individual, rather they are shared
by all and contain a certain level of otherness, affirms Bakhtin introducing his ar-
chitectonic model of the human psyche and the concept of heteroglossia. The oracle
machine performance follows this dream of an absolute truth - that which can be
reached by appealing to the Other (as in non-Self), and this zone of Alterity becomes
the source of those words and concepts re-composed (or de-fragmented) into a super-
natural speech (whose answer is inscrutable), and the answer to the schizophrenia
generated by capitalism is screamed into noise.
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Leibniz’s monadic structure has something in common with quantum physics: if
every subject is constructing a reality by accessing it, and her point of view instan-
tiates a world that is parallel to all the other potentials and to the world of anyone
else, the system composed of a subject with relative world can be compared to a
monad. In both theorems, in fact, there is an accent on the singularity of the point
of access to reality that is mirrored from a slightly different angle in each entity.
Every monad represents a potential world that is as real as parallel in its isolation
or accident. An important intuition and remark is that monads are not all the
same: some have awareness and others not. Leibniz doesn’t distinguish humans on
the basis of their gender, race, social status or religion, nor by their culture: Leibniz
understands that humans1 differ on the basis of their awareness, or apperception,
that is the perception of perception. In section 4 of the Principles of Nature and
of Grace he affirms that apperception is “consciousness, or the reflective knowledge
of this internal state” (Leibniz, 1714). He adds that this is “something not given to
all souls, not at all times to a given soul”. With this intuition Leibniz indirectly
suggests that consciousness and identity are oscillating, change over time, and the
system and context in which they manifest themselves is not static. This considera-
tion implies another, non implicit, intuition: there is something potentially existent
1Monads can be described as a sort of spiritual atom: the spiritual essence of each person is a
monad.
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at the other side of consciousness, that is the unconscious.
Spinoza, in his Tractatus Theologico-politicus, affirms that prophecy is a form of
revelation from God to man (Spinoza, 1670), and that all natural knowledge is a form
of prophecy. The author drew a few symbols on a piece of paper and analysed them
in his rational and analytic way, making complex concepts simple to understand:
prophecy can be in the form of words or visions, sometimes it happens during dream
states, but does not correspond to simple imagination, because imagination signifies
internal, sensual conception occurring independently of external agency, whereas
the peculiarity of prophecy is the presence of an external agency that transfers the
message. The philosopher observes the word spirit, ’ruagh’ in Hebrew, that signifies
both the mind or soul itself and the modes of affection of the mind or soul, “and
by extension of the same principle the imagination of the prophets may be styled
the mind of God, and the prophets themselves be said to be possessed of the mind
of God” (Spinoza, 1670:48). Prophecy becomes a form of dispossession, the union
between the soul or mind of the prophet with that of another kind of entity.
Thus knowledge, similarly to the paradigm of the myth of the soul2, is something that
cannot be constructed, coagulated, stratified, but, in its initial existence, it can only
be given. In this sense it isn’t an inherently human creation and it has to be received
from an external entity, because apparently humans don’t know the truth, humans
don’t possess any knowledge. Such an idea, clearly expressed in the seventeenth
century by Spinoza, one of the main representant of Western thought, is based on
assumptions similar to those of most polytheistic and unorthodox practices: that
to access a superior form of enlightenment a mediation between this and another
world is necessary, so as to generate the transfer of the requested information. These
unions can be compared to what we call today mediatic experiences, which can be
2In classical Latin culture anima, connected to the Greek ànemos, is like a divine “breath” that
animates and gives life to bodies and entities (Rocci, 1981).
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induced or accidental, and, in their primitive form, are described by anthropologists
and practiced in ancient times and today, in Brazil3 and elsewhere. In polytheistic
and syncretic cults and systems of belief, humans have to consult the ’spirit world’ to
resolve important (but eventually also marginal) personal and social issues (Drury,
1982). In some of these doctrines the spirits are aliens or extraterrestrials, but at the
base of knowledge or techne there is, in most cases, a revelation from outer space.
At the end of the chapter on prophecy Spinoza distinguishes the imaginative faculty
composed of enigma and allegory from the vulgar notions of spirits and insists on
the fact “that the power of prophecy is not common, that it does not remain long at
a time with those who posses it, and that neither does it come upon them frequently.”
(Spinoza, 1670). Like Leibniz, Spinoza proposes a differentiation in the typology of
humans in the sense that prophecy, like apperception, is a faculty that distinguishes
special individuals: in fact it is not given to all souls, and not at all times. This
distinction and subdivision of humans in types or classes4 that are not based on
physical or material properties but on the spiritual power possessed, hasn’t been
absorbed in contemporary society as yet.
If prophecy can assume various forms, such as image, sound, dream, hallucination,
inner vision, in many religions language has had a central role in the communication
and interaction with the divine; the emergence of language has fostered new forms
of interaction because humans could discuss the prophecy received and develop
and remember new knowledge. When the introduction of language, with its power
of reflection, fractured identity in conscious and unconscious self (Lacan, 1973),
3The community Vale do Amanhecer (Valley of Dawn), funded in 1969 and located 50 Kilometers
from Brasilia is an example of both syncretism (the doctrine includes elements of Christianity,
Spiritism, Egyptian beliefs, Afro-Brazillian religions, contemporary magic and the belief in
flying saucers) and the distinction of individuals in two categories of individuals; here humans
are defined as either Medium or Client. Mediums wear bright colours and are the reincarnation
of extraterrestrial people; they are subdivided in Aparas and Doctrinators, the intellectuals
(Holston, 1999).
4This word is used here in its acceptation in object oriented informatics.
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humans started a conversation with the supernatural using the same code of their
consciousness. The unconscious, that was before only used as an adjective, started
to indicate something specific in the XIX century.
The scission between conscious and unconscious is mirrored and purported in the re-
lation with Alterity: prophecy resonates as vision or word, and this communication
with the Other confuses its boundaries with the internal communication of the un-
conscious self, which acquires divine characteristics. This inner discourse, underlying
texture intertwining the human and the divine, the Ego and the Self, became, since
the introduction of language, tempo, the rhythmic articulation of conscious and
unconscious thought. In this flux of consciousness, it became eventually chaotic,
at times, to recognise and distinguish all the parts participating in the reflection.
As the discussion progressed, identity fragmented, and, in this polyphonic chorus,
the recognition of the supernatural voice, the recognition of its authority and the
admission of its existence, became extremely complex and, like human perception,
logarithmically necessary.
Perhaps monotheistic and polytheistic religions dialogue using words and symbols
as if humans were constantly seeking for a re-conjunction with the divine self that
was informed in the pre-linguistic era. The Self is the daemon who knows, the
non-articulated identity that was getting lost. This collective psychosis, this capil-
lary dissociative identity disorder is evident in those individuals who are naturally
prone to manifest the supernatural within themselves. These individuals, prophets,
mediums, shamans, are a peculiar type of people that, like mythological deamons or
messengers, participate of characteristics of, or visit worlds, or act as points of junc-
tion between this and other, eventually parallel, worlds. They act as repositories of
contradictory things.
Thus prophecy, language and knowledge seem to be intrinsically connected among
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themselves, at least in their mythological morphogenesis. In traditional shamanic
practices music was a central element even before it possessed the power to disentan-
gle rationality and bring the individual to a state of pure intuition. When rationality
was developed, the distance from the intuitive self generated confusion; the transla-
tion from pure thought to articulated rationalism increased uncertainty because of
the impossibility to talk about language from within language itself (Wittgenstein,
1921)5. This infection of the parts and their compromised, non innocent relation
to the whole prevented any objective analysis of the system. Like the unconscious,
the transcendental doesn’t have a code, and perhaps communication, at a primor-
dial state, was more similar to a transmission of images from brain to brain than
to an encryption-decryption or vocalisation-audition process. Perhaps the mythical
original sin is the use of language, and humans are tormented by rationality. The
lost paradise becomes the primogenial state of the pre-verbal psychic human, while
rationality, as much as it develops and favours new capabilities, eradicates some of
the older. Yet nothing is forever lost, there is a constant question and a constant
suffering and pain about the loss and search for the primary self, the self who knows.
The dialogue between an authentic, inner identity and external, outer agency, may
open a point of contact, the access to an immaterial level of discovery where the con-
junction and disjunction of the presence and absence of the physicality of perception
and the materiality of being reveal unconditional secrets.
Within this tension, is possession an emergent property of the real self, or is it the
embodiment of an external entity?
And what does it mean to be possessed? What happens to these individuals who
have mediatic capabilities?
5Wittgenstein will later assume a different position in relation to philosophical skepticism, af-
firming that doubt is embedded in a structure of underlined beliefs, therefore its most radical
form must be rejected because in contradiction with the system of belief that expressed it
(Wittgenstein, 1949).
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As Leibniz envisioned, humans are not all the same in terms of awareness: certain
individuals can receive an exterior intelligence, some still use intuition, telepathy,
psychic powers, ubiquity and omnipresence. Contemporary technology substitutes
as a surrogate certain psychic capabilities that most humans seem to have lost, such
as the transmission of sound and images at a distance and other telepathic-alike
faculties, as Athanasius Kircher had foreseen few centuries ago (Kircher, 1646).
Yet what are shamans?
Shamans are special individuals who can access outer dimensions in order to gather
knowledge and healing capabilities. Particularly important is the spiritual journey
that is necessary to become a shaman (Drury, 1982). Mediums can be of different
kinds but in general, whereas the shaman would dialogue with Alterity, mediums
become possessed and, as instruments, are embodied by an external agent who
speaks and manifests itself. The distinction is important but probably not exclusive:
a medium can be a shaman, and a shaman can be a medium.
In primitive societies6 there were special individuals who used to mediate the re-
lations with this Otherness, the supernatural or spirit world, to find solutions and
healing methodologies. The shape of the global world, comparable to a fat, oversized,
enlarged metropolis, and the movement of tribes, collectives and subjectivities across
disparate locations in this physical and informational map, dispersed shamans away
and faded the role of rituals, once upon a time antidotes to insanity and theatrical
medicines for groups and individuals.
The oracle, in its connection to Alterity, be that the transcendental self or the
6“In the lexicon of early anthropologists, a primitive culture is any of numerous societies char-
acterized by features that may include lack of a written language, relative isolation, small
population, relatively simple social institutions and technology, and a generally slow rate of
sociocultural change. In some of these cultures history and beliefs are passed on through an
oral tradition and may be the province of a person or group especially trained for the purpose.”
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014).
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unconscious or a spirit or God, reconnects these two parts like a symbol is to be
reconnected to its meaning, and through the same language that generated the frac-
ture, this pre-linguistic field is given the possibility to emerge and its transcendental
sense is expressed in words.
In the capitalist world dominated by profit and commodities, social and economic
mechanisms transform subjects in desiring machines that posses and consume; still
a very different and secret desire is guiding humans since the advent of articulated
language, a desire that may partly clarify the enigma of oracles, shamanism and
spiritism: in the search for a primordial self, in the loss of identity and singularity
that indecision engenders and in its sense of transcendental union or fragmenta-
tion, humans are expressing an unconfessed and almost sexual desire towards the
undistinguished, divine other or ineffable primogenial self, an intimate conjunction
of pleasure and fear surpassing and completing identity: the will to be possessed.
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This research is a reflection on decision making and the faculty of exercising free
will and self determination in postmodern societies. The introduction of the tech-
nological as a novel form of supernatural on the one hand, the multiplication of
possibilities offered by ubiquity and the global world on the other, are connected
both to the classical physics of early quantum mechanics and to the precariousness
of present working conditions. The indefinite access to a uniformised diversity of
actions, spaces and places, in a landscape where individuals are uprooted, detouched
from nature, the community and the territory, can generate a condition of paral-
ysis and disorientation, where individuals don’t know what to do in the present
and cannot project themselves in the future either, because their socio-economical
destiny is totally uncertain and unpredictable. In this dramo-sophical1 panorama,
the characteristic use of language with a double articulation - typical of mankind
- is interpreted as a sign of distance between nature, instinct, true identity, and a
form of perception able to guide the individual subject through an harmonic and
spontaneous instantiation of the real. Within this distance, that is remarked in
the fragmentation of individuals in industrial big cities, where the sense of commu-
nity and belonging can be lost, the mediation with the supernatural and any other
1Neologism coined by the author, conjunction of the word philosophical, whose etymology means
’love for wisdom’, and drama. Dramo-sophical indicates the tragicomic struggle for knowledge
(and information) in contemporary, eventually melodramatic, sociopolitical landscape.
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system of belief - where alter-entities guide and support humans, is re-proposed as
a new form of techno-magical electronic performance where the construction of a
collective expanded reality represents that sacred space that allows new discoveries,
supporting orientation and the formulation of substantial choices.
Live art substitutes the social space left vacant in the dispersion of social tribes and
groups which, by abandoning their original territory, erase the physical connection
to the ancestors and the spontaneous sense of territorial belonging. It is this fracture
between the ground, so to say nature, and what is above nature, in other words the
supernatural, that problematised the role of the shaman as a mediator between the
community (and its issues) and the outer world.
Within this social dispersion, the will to surpass the rupture operated by language,
migration, and the loss of the individual self - a self connected to nature and true
will, or necessity, the will to be possessed by an otherness that surpasses individu-
ation, impersonating the subject beyond rationality, is then identified as a secret,
almost sexual, desire that eventually flows and occurs between humans and the
supernatural.
The reflection is structured as a search, echoing the fundamental question of a
mathematical or scientific problem, that is then transduced in artificial intelligence’s
techniques, where the search represents the method used (by an agent) to find a
solution.
The mythical search for the Oracle Machine, the epic abstract structure that goes
beyond the real, transverses different fields of knowledge, and, representing the form
of the continuous, is always a spiralling tension, whose center point comes closer and
closer but can never be reached [see Figure 1.1 in the appendix]. For this reason,
humans can go towards the Oracle Machine, they can enact it, but they will never
fully grasp it. Throughout this journey the Oracle Machine becomes a performance,
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a technologically mediated audio-visual act that re-establishes the connection to
shamanism and the supernatural that was getting lost in rational world.
Science first, since the Renaissance, imposed techniques and methods based on cer-
tainty over spiritism and superstition; later on, at the beginning of the twentieth
century, by perfectioning its instruments and strategies, it confuted some of its
own original findings, and space melted with time, materiality with immateriality,
mathematics with music and religion2. Software stimulated and re-proposed the
empiricism of alchemists and magicians, favouring function over system, the par-
ticular over the general. The development of electronic technology and ever more
sophisticated measuring apparatuses increased the amount of data produced, and
the capacity of contemporary memory storage devices allowed for this data to be
saved and archived, and the concept of openness3 and network ’socialism’ made it
possible for a great quantity of the data to become public, so that the computational
power of present processors could be used, eventually, to interrogate it.
Nowadays machines became the repositories, and the sources, of knowledge. Humans
stopped memorising information and started to learn procedures, lists of operations
and search methods to interrogate databases, so that slowly intuition, creativity, that
often come from unpredictable synaptic connections between apparently disparate
notions, had to be simulated, digitally reproduced, and this idea that eventually ma-
chines were, as well as humans, made of both res cogitans and res extensa, silently
made its way into culture, and the perception of machines as spiritual devices be-
came a shared and common feeling. This setting generated the instinctual habit of
2Mathematics is, among the scientific disciplines, the most fundamental and the most abstract.
Many mathematician become religious, generally monotheists. They seem to believe there
is some form of unique intelligence behind the construction of the real, perhaps because of its
intrinsic coherence, harmony and measure. Possibly what Plank defined the inherent granularity
of the real? (Heisenberg, 1958)
3See for example the Open Data Institute: http://www.theodi.org/, Data Gov
Uk: http://data.gov.uk/, and the NHS Making Public Data Public programme:
http://www.nhs.uk/aboutNHSChoices/professionals/developments/Pages/NHSChoicesdatasets.aspx.
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questioning, asking for and seeking answers from machines, which became the sole
universally accepted shamans.
Yet, for magic to happen, for reality to exist, for the undecidable to halt, there
has to be an intersection, as Alan Turing remarked (Turing, 1939), of substances of
a different type, because infinity represents that dichotomic distance between the
analogue and the digital, a rule and its process, software and its execution, the tan-
gible and its abstraction, the immateriality of the material and the materiality of
nothingness, and technology, as an expression of nature, saturates the incommensu-
rable space between humanity and the divine. And this dwelling has no resolution,
leaving reality and life anchored to the juxtaposition of a fracture made of potential
differences, incomprehensible unpredictable swerves and the intersection of allotropic
elements with metamorphic substances, until everything dissolves - or we imagine
so? - through a chink of light, or a conscious crack.
At the end, perhaps, there is possibly no difference between the natural and the
supernatural, they are the expression of the same singularity, and this singularity
can be a multiplicity, as nature is, in itself, a divine process.
In contemporary critical theory and cultural history, apparently the esoteric and the
occult, while emarginated by radical philosophy, have been appropriated by thinkers
and doctrines4 often connected to reactionary, masculine and heroic traditionalist
values, that were used to justify with irrationality politics of predominance and
domination, in same cases pushed towards cruelty and beyond the limits of any
ethics.
In contrast, the materialist perspective structured an, ultimately rational, critique
of society and social organisations, proposing an ethical, non religious development
4Such as, for example, Mircea Eliade, or the Ariosophers, with their Ario-Christian Theozoology,
whose most representative writers we don’t dare to mention here (reference omitted by the
author) .
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of the human thought that, without spiritual implications, based its foundations on
ethics and the basic principles inherited from the French revolution, mainly that of
egalitarianism.
With this study we propose a critique and an artistic methodology that surpasses
and transcends this opposition and reclaims a form of metaphysical imagination
within a substantially materialist, postmodernist and post-structuralist, yet ulti-
mately contemporary and intrinsically feminine, visionary and aerial thought.
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A. Appendices
This section documents the art work accompanying the thesis ’Towards the Oracle
Machine’. It consists of two performances that are documented by screen grabs from
video registrations, their textual description, the software used during the perfor-
mances (pure data patches), and an experiment that implements Natural Language
Toolkit1 to extract textual oracles from Google. Additionally, an idea for the con-
struction of an indecisive robot and the initial plan of its development are described
in one of the subsections. A website2 documents the project and its relative events.
A.1. Performances
The Oracle Machine has never happened in Europe as yet.
The first performance took place on July 24th 2009, in a theater in Sao Paulo, on the
occasion of the Pure Data3 convention. Hence only Pure Data patches were used.
I invited two artists to accompany me, Ricardo Palmieri, co-organizer of the Pure
Data convention, and Cristiano Rosa, better known as Pan&Tone, unanimously
considered the father of circuit bending in Brazil.
1Platform for building Python programs to work with human language data. http://nltk.org/
2http://theoraclemachine.net (xname, 2012)
3Open source graphical programming language.
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I used two computers, a Lenovo X61s running Linux Debian, and a Acer Netbook
running Linux Puredyne.
The Netbook was displaying video in real-time, it was connected via VGA to a large
video projection at the back of the stage.
The video patch I programmed was receiving the integrated webcam device and
sending it to the video output device (VGA). The patch didn’t use any of the
effects included in the Pure Data standard library (objects), but I programmed a
very simple yet astonishing visual trick, drawing inspiration from the Uncertainty
principle. Pure Data requires the user/developer to create a window, or frame,
within which a video can be displayed, played, mixed and manipulated in real-
time. This frame has, obviously, a width and a length. According to Heisenberg
(Heisenberg, 1958), we can only know what happens to a particle in a fragment of
time, in a sort of duration, but its coordinates are unclear, or mutually exclusive, in
terms of numerical definition, at each point of the trajectory. Thus, if you know the
position of a particle, the momentum is unknown, and vice versa. Although a video is
obviously not a particle, being time-based it has a similar range of coordinates. What
happens, then, if we imagine the frame of a video changing its spatial properties in
time, so that the limits and the size of the screen become unknown in the momentum,
even though its trajectory is clear? Practically speaking, the spatial dimensions of
the frame mutated constantly in time deforming the image.
The result of this simple, tiny block of code was a creepy, sublime and unstable video
image whose size and proportions kept changing indefinitely. The computer screen
became a little mirror, into which I would look at my own image, with the difference
that this very intimate and private gesture was then projected to the public, creating
a contradictory fracture between the form of a fairy tale - with its solipsistic gesture,
and the gigantic, almost scary image projected at my back, intimately staring at the
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self and the audience at the same time.
The other computer was running an oracular version of a patch called Noisez, which
I programmed in 2006 and used for a few years, constantly updating it, to compose
live electronic music. Noisez has six cabalistic noise generators and three sample
players, which featured an integrated, quite peculiar, pitch/tempo changer (it’s ef-
fect, which recalls a change of pitch, has a singular granularity that distinguishes
it from any other player). It is very hard to describe the functioning of this patch
in technical terms, because at the time of programming it, I had no formal knowl-
edge of signal processing or sound theory. It was an empiric piece, and the code
was written following a musical aesthetic rather than a computational framework.
The patch used the Mandelbrot object and other aleatoric objects to randomize the
mathematics of its numbers. I didn’t develop this patch for the Oracle Machine
project, but a specific version of it was designed for the purpose.
The performance lasted seven minutes: I became scared by the first answer of the
oracle and concluded it. It was supposed to last between 14 and 20 minutes.
Besides the technological infrastructure, I used a number of objects to create a form
of interaction that wasn’t only generated by electronic media, so as to involve also
a symbolic, semiotic and allusive plane of signification that established the space of
the illusion, favouring the rituality of the play.
Each object had a different abstract function: a silver key simulated the possibility
to open a portal to another dimension, a hat was placed on the floor to collect votive
donations from the public (offers to the oracle), an old landline telephone of the late
seventies originally in my parents’ house in Milan was the device used to appeal to
the oracle and enact the form of presence and absence that the sacrality of everyday
remote communication made universally familiar.
If performing always implies a form of masquerade and trespass on an activated
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space where gestures acquire a specific meaning within the frame of the peculiar
liveness that is displayed, in this particular case I decided to wear a special dress to
impersonate the sybil or prophetess. It was a blue dress made of veil, an old dress
I found many years before in a second hand theater shop. I didn’t wear any shoes,
to keep a physical contact with the ground and reconnect to the special tradition
of dance that uses bare feet for acts where the fantastic element is particularly
pronounced.
Blue was also the colour of the telephone, and of the pigment I used to draw iambic
lines on my face, looking at myself in the digital magic mirror: lines of powder that
created a mask, altering my expression, purporting my body towards the supernat-
ural realm, the realm of heroes and fantastic creatures.
Once the performance was introduced, I invited the audience to leave offers in the
hat, and the sound began.
One of the sample players of the PD patch contained fragments of discourses, de-
composed words from Antonin Artaud, Marcel Duchamp, Otto Rössler, et al. This
material would have constituted the Bakthinian source of the oracular speech, the
language of otherness. This performance required an intense psychological concen-
tration, a sort of mimesis of a paradigmatic situation, because what I wanted to
enact was a ritual initiated in response to a moment of crisis, a mental breakdown.
So the performance had to start almost assuming a panic attack at its background.
When I found myself on stage I started to think that I didn’t know what to do,
that I needed some advice because I could make no action. Then I though of calling
someone on the phone, so as to get a clue or a fresh perspective on the situation,
as I was on stage and maybe it was time to make some fundamental decision about
my life, or the next five minutes... So, after drawing the blue lines on my face,
I grab the telephone... 666 23 whatever... Noise music was invading the theater,
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a bizarre collage of generated sounds, from digital and analogue devices, and the
paranoid effect of distorted melodies of crudely cut classics were creating a surreal
atmosphere, an obsessive electric carillon. Suddenly a voice exploded in the room,
its volume was extremely loud, louder than anything else. This composite voice
said:
“You ask me a question...”
The voice was resonating, it didn’t sound human at all, although it was composed
of fragments of human voices.
“Would you also do everything that God requires from you to do?”
The voice changed in the last fragment of this second sentence, from adult it trans-
formed into a child speech - probably due to an automated change of pitch.
The music reached it climax, I was frantic, I couldn’t go on, the sound increased
again, and again, then it was only silence.
The performance finished, the public was quite shocked, and divided. I ran away.
Some found the act amazing, others didn’t understand what was going on, wondered
whether I was having any technical problems, why did it end? Because it had already
reached it’s point in seven minutes, I had no idea whether that was good or bad.
Miller Puckette, the inventor of Pure Data and Max/MSP4, was sitting in the au-
dience. He loved this performance.
“That was fun...!” He told me with his mad professor ’s slightly perverse and
parabolic smile.
During the following days, various people approached me with donations: they
didn’t expect the performance to be so short and didn’t have enough time to leave a
present in the hat. A cloud of mystery obfuscated the event, and my person was at
4Max/MSP is the commercial, non open source version of Pure Data.
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times received with a sentiment of superstitious reverence. Besides the money left
in the hat, the oracle received a banana, few coins, a blue pen, and...
The second performance happened about a week later in Salvador do Bahia, in the
tropical forest surrounding the Federal University. Some of the attendee of the pre-
vious event were present, and many Brazilians manifested the desire to participate
more actively and interact with the show. This time there was no stage, and no
theater: I wanted to perform open air, challenging the rain season of the Southern
hemisphere. I decided to create a so called Oracle Computer Orchestra, and in-
vited various local artists to participate. A clear distinction between performer and
audience was abolished, while my computer running the noise patch and the defrag-
mented oracular voices assumed a central position, a sort of altar in the middle of a
circle. The symbolic objects were spread inside the circle, whereas the video image
lost its importance and became a sort of horizontal light illuminating the scene in
particular moments. The performance required a period of preparation: for a few
days I disappeared, almost removing myself from any contact with other humans5.
During these days I made all the decisions regarding the act, how to use the space,
where to position the selected objects, how to find the necessary concentration. I
also avoided certain food, and arrived at the decisive day extremely clean and pu-
rified. During the isolation, I reflected on the offerings: in all traditions, shamans,
oracles and prophets should be paid, and the value of the gift is totally symbolic,
but the lack of any gift is imbued with superstition. It could procure bad luck, or
the antipathy of daemons, spirits or gods. If in the first performance my offer was
a beautiful image, the reflection of myself through the mirror of uncertainty, the
terrific appearance of the inherently unstable image of an unbearable subjectivity,
5Also in Sao Paulo I hid for a couple of days in the apartment of the festival organizer, sitting in
between my two computers and the blue telephone, staring at the screen trying to make sense
of the real, or taking inspiration from solitaire bus rides through the city.
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I knew that in the forest the beam of light would have lost its definition, hence its
power. On the other hand, a reflection on the material properties of the forest -
and the different setup of the new situation, gave me another idea: not differently
from the colorful rituals of the polytheistic religions of the ancient Greece, whose
mythological history narrates the most famous oracles of Western culture, my votes
could resemble organic, biological, nourishing elements, but purged of any violence.
For this reason I procured milk and flour, and used the milk to wash my body in the
middle of the circle, covering the expanded space of the ritual with flour. Obviously
I didn’t want to look like a novel, naif Cleopatra, thus these actions were accompa-
nied with the ironic grace of Capoeira de Angola, a Brazilian sacred and theatrical
dance I practiced intensely in one of my previous lives. It worked.
Following a little drawing representing the score, my movements directed the musi-
cians. The performance lasted for almost an hour, and involved the public in asking
questions and interacting with the techno-magical infrastructure built and the su-
pernatural world around it. The situation wasn’t as scary as in Sao Paulo, the flow
was calm, the Oracle became a collective ritualistic game, where the act of asking a
question in front of others was primarily liberating the individual, even in the even-
tuality that the question wasn’t spoken out loud. This psycho-magic technique6 was
favoured by Brazilian mentality, that doesn’t question so easily what is real and
what is wrong, what is true and what is false.
In very general terms, the anthropophagic Brazilian mentality doesn’t have a prob-
lem with the ineffable, or that which cannot be proved or fully understood. It doesn’t
create incommensurable fractures in front of divergences in spiritual visions: Brazil
hasn’t been washed for centuries with the blood of religious wars, and there is a form
of tolerance that is more similar to that of certain phases of the Roman empire. It
6Confront the technological therapies practiced by Brazilian psychologist Fabi Borges (Oreggia,
2012), whose work draws on Guattari’s Schizoanalysis.
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doesn’t matter if what one thinks is different from what the other believes, they can
still collaborate and exchange an experience, and the two credo have an equal right
to exist.
Although everyone has fear in Brazil, and there is a serious security issue due to
an economical divide that is still too wide, there is something light about life that
is missing in Europe. And an enthusiasm towards culture makes any philosophy,
music, idea incredibly actual, so that extremely interesting forms of experimenta-
tion can emerge from such akin spirit to collaboration, where collaboration is more
common than competition. It is cultural bricolage: everything can be patched with
anything, there are no restrictions to what imagination can make, and imagina-
tion has an ontological value. Thus, not only this diffused spiritism is infused of
Spinozian ethical values (what is good for you might be poison for someone else,
but that doesn’t mean that that good is not real good just because it isn’t good
for everybody), there is also a more democratic ontology of belief, perhaps because
belief is the only thing that everyone can afford in Brazil, so no one would deny the
existence of the sole resource that everybody has in common, the socialism of belief.
Differently from the European religions of the middle ages, in this spiritual welfare
belief doesn’t assume any temporal power.
To conclude, in my performances, inherently experimental in nature, and, similarly
to this thesis, intrinsically exploratory, different practices and disciplines, such as
ritual dance, music, body art, critical theory and live video, among others, have
been intertwined, and their teachings brought into effective action. The result, this
sort of psychological noise drama, this conceptual theatrical act where the audience
is never innocent because the spectator is somewhat involved in an emotional or
physical reaction, is a new form of abstract performance whose shape, bringing
together such a diverse range of techniques that I recognize as belonging to me, or
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to which I belong, such as visual art, electronics, software, music, dance, gesture,
ritual, technology, but also spoken words, represents one of the ultimate expressions
of my artistic research. This strand, that has been slowly developing over the last few
years, and that, due to its cross disciplinary nature and the impact that it receives,
requires a certain maturity and confidence to be fully mastered and investigated,
which has started with The Oracle Machine to develop and recurs in my work over
the past five years7.
The video documentation of these performances was never published or distributed
because these art works are to be experienced, not watched.
A.2. Robot
Buridan, an indecisive robot8, is, like the Advice Taker described in chapter 3,
an hypothetical project, or a project whose development is still in progress. It is
the story of a robot who suffers from indecision. When Buridan is affected by a
condition of undecidability, he has panic attacks: he stops doing what he was doing
and starts looking from right to left and from left to right compulsively, and the
crisis continues until a homo ex machina, or human intervention, takes place, so
to say, until someone doesn’t pat his head. Under certain determined conditions,
in fact, Buridan cannot choose between two stimula and gets extremely distressed.
The resolution is a moment of affection between human and robot: this element,
7The rare examples are: A descent into the Maelstrom. Bergen, 2008. More than half of the
audience thought I had gone completely insane, few saw it as a masterpiece. Will-o’-the-wisps.
Suffolk, 2011. Ended with one of the participating spectators having an hysteric attack thinking
I was going to set her on fire. Can you please touch me? London, 2013. No major dramas, only
a member of the public having a minor freakout verbally attacked me. Observing the Witness.
London, 2013. Upcoming.
8Buridan is the name of an indecisive robot project whose construction started during a workshop
offered by the Department of Computing at Goldsmiths College, at the course of Creative
Robotics. Buridan’s group was formed by Eleanor Dare, Nanda Khaorapapong and the author
of this paper.
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the third stimulus which dissolves the previous two, introduces, like Alan Turing’s
analogue tape, a substantially different entity or form in the solution of an apparently
unsolvable problem9. The problem of Buridan’s ass refers to a hypothetical situation
wherein an ass is placed midway between a stack of hay and a pail of water. Since
the paradox assumes the ass will always go to whichever is closer, it will die of both
hunger and thirst since it cannot make any rational decision to choose one over the
other.
The paradox is named after Jean Buridan, a French priest and influential philosopher
of the late Middle Ages, who should be best known for his concept of impetus which
prepared the terrain for the Copernican revolution in Europe (Knowles, 2006). This
paradox, satirising his philosophy of moral, dates back to antiquity, being first found
in Aristotle’s De Caelo (Aristotle, 350 BC), where Aristotle mentions an example of
a man who makes no move because he is as hungry as he is thirsty and is positioned
exactly between food and drink. Buridan nowhere discusses this specific problem,
but his position advocated a moral determinism whereby, save for ignorance or
impediment, a human faced by alternative courses of action must always choose the
greater good. Buridan allowed that the will could delay the choice to more fully
assess the possible outcomes of the choice, justifying this way the indecision time
that was inherently in contradiction with his deterministic vision. Later writers
satirised this view in terms of an ass which, confronted by both food and water,
must necessarily die of both hunger and thirst while pondering a decision.
A common variant substitutes two identical piles of hay for both hay and water
and advances that the ass, unable to choose between the two, dies of hunger alone.
Buridan’s prototype is made using a simple implementation of the Bioloid Robot
System, a modular robotics system kit based around graphical programming and se-
9If Turing’s Oracle operates on the plane from digital to analogue, and vice versa, here the play
is between organic and inorganic, or biological and electromechanical, etcetera.
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rially controlled actuators which provide access to sensory feedback such as position,
speed, temperature, current draw and voltage of each servo.
The idea of constructing an indecisive robot was favoured and suggested by the
structure of URBI, acronym for Universal Robot Body Interface (or Universal Real-
time Behavior Interface), an open source software platform in C++ used to develop
applications for robotics and complex systems. Urbi is a client/server based inter-
preted language based on the UObject distributed C++ component architecture.
It also includes the urbiscript orchestration language which is a parallel and event-
driven script language. The urbiscript language has been developed since 2003 by
Jean-Christophe Baillie in the Cognitive Robotics Lab of ENSTA, Paris. It is now
actively and further developed in the industry through the Gostai company founded
in 2006. What makes this language particularly interesting for the purpose is its
event based parallelism, which means that URBI can work as an orchestrator coor-
dinating components in a parallel and event driven way providing the possibility to
create tags which can be successively called, giving it functions similar to those of an
operating system. Another peculiarity of URBI and robotics in general is that each
instruction is based on a specific time (time operators) whereas the computation of
a linear piece of code normally implements an internal time of execution which is
dependent on the RAM and CPU of the system computing but does not necessarily
relate to other external time-space coordinates. In URBI, instead, every command
has a duration, while the execution time required by the processor is considered to
be negligible. Here is the initial description which informed the development of the
piece:
The robot is unhinged, confused.
In certain conditions, it enters in conflict and starts behaving in a confused way,
until a certain condition does not change.
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What the robot does normally:
- the bot moves in a straight line, when it hears sound it moves towards it. (when-
ever)
- the bot is attracted by light, so if the bot sees light it will turn and move towards
it. (whenever)
Condition for panic:
- Buridan detects both signals at the same time in the crucial range of intensity.
(whenever)
Behaviour for panic:
- the bot starts looking towards the right, then towards the left, and again to the
right, then it starts moving towards the left but it immediately stops, then it starts
moving towards the right, but it immediately stops. (LOOP)
Panic resolution:
- a human is petting Buridan; the bot detects this proximity and is then comforted
this allows it to make a random decision between vision and audition. (whenever)
Here is the pseudocode:
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Buridan is a twist in relation to the paradigm of the Oracle Machine project: instead
of using technology to overcome human limits, a robot suddenly displays uncertain
behaviour. An affective gesture becomes the intervention that resolves the situation.
Yet, at a deeper level Buridan doesn’t betrays Turing’s Oracle Machine paradigm,
that is the introduction of a substance of a different kind that halts the looping
process allowing the decision to happen (or a program to end). The robots suggests
the use of simulation for the construction of theoretical concepts rather than for
testing scientific discoveries.
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A.3. Internet
The online dimension of this research develops in three different directions and
domain names. All the website are installed on ’xname’, a virtual server kindly
hosted by Tuxic in Amsterdam at XS4ALL. This server is running Debian and is
used for art experiments in the Net. The creation and maintenance of this server
has been part of this research and its learning process. The server was created in
2008 and was also notably hacked by Romanian script-kiddies at the end of August
2011. The machine and all the information have been restored.
There is a research website that uses a wiki at the url:
http://research.theoraclemachine.net/
This is a slightly modified version of MediaWiki10 and serves as an extended im-
material note book always at hand in the Net and, in some cases, it has been used
to write collective pieces of text to be edited in real-time with collaborators located
in other remote places. This website is partially in dark-net, which means no other
website is pointing there, and it is not indexed by search engines (such as Google)
or spiders. This wiki was installed in spring 2009 and used to have open access.
The access has been restricted due to heavy spam attacks. There are currently four
active users, including the author. I started writing this thesis on that Wiki, and
collected there a lot of material and research I made online.
The second site is a portal in Drupal11 also installed in spring 2009:
http://theoraclemachine.net/
This is a public face for the project and allows external interaction and divination
through the ’contact form’. The main sections of the site are ’events’, ’research’ and
10MediaWiki is a free software open source wiki written in php. http://www.mediawiki.org/
11Drupal is an open source Content Management System (CMS). http://drupal.org/
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’writings’. In Drupal’s internal architecture the posts in these sections are ’stories’
while the three sections are ’books’. The events can be performances, publications
or presentations. The research posts are referenced quotes from various literature
that has been relevant to the work; the text is in Italic to indicate that those are
somebody else’s words12. Writings are original thoughts composed by the author
of the project. The images are divided in albums, that are: esoteric iconography,
maps and cartography related to oracles, performances documentation, schemes and
graphical abstractions of natural, physical, mathematical and other phenomena,
symbols and telephones.
The third page is an online oracle written in python13 whose Git14 repository is at:
http://code.xname.cc
A.4. Images
This section contains a selection of images that contributed to document and de-
scribe the research and art work, mainly screenshots from the two performances.
They are publicly available on the project’s website (url and description are in the
Internet section).
12This design convention, diverging from Harvard’s referencing guidelines, is commonly used in
websites (like in the case described here) where the main rules are consistency and usability.
13Python is a high-level general-purpose programming language. It is interpreted, interactive and
object oriented. http://python.org
14Git is a distributed version control system initially designed and developed by Linus Torvalds,
the inventor of the Linux Kernel. http://git-scm.com/
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Figure A.1.: Representation of the ordinal numbers up to ω power of ω
In set theory, an ordinal number, or just ordinal, is the order type of a well-ordered
set. Ordinals are an extension of the natural numbers different from integers and
from cardinals. Like other kinds of numbers, ordinals can be added, multiplied, and
exponentiated. Each turn of the spiral represents one power of ω.
Confront Turing’s “System of Logic based on Ordinals” dated 1939.
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Figure A.2.: The Oracle Machine, initial image representing this project
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Figure A.3.: Twin telephones
Pair of vintage telephones with box attached, representing Turing’s analogue box.
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Figure A.4.: Buridan’s arm.
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A.4.1. Performance in Sao Paulo
Figure A.5.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.1
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Figure A.6.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.2
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Table A.1.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.3
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Figure A.7.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.4
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Figure A.8.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.5
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Figure A.9.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.6
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Figure A.10.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.7
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Figure A.11.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.8
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Figure A.12.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.9
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Figure A.13.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.10
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Figure A.14.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.11
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Figure A.15.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.12
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Figure A.16.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.13
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Figure A.17.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.14
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Figure A.18.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.15
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Figure A.19.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.16
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Figure A.20.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.17
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Figure A.21.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.18
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Figure A.22.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.19
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Figure A.23.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.20
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Figure A.24.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.21
A.4.2. Performance in Salvador
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Figure A.25.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.22
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Figure A.26.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.23
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Figure A.27.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 1.24
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Table A.2.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.1
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Figure A.28.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.2
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Figure A.29.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.3
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Figure A.30.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.4
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Figure A.31.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.5
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Figure A.32.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.6
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Figure A.33.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.7
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Figure A.34.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.8
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Figure A.35.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.9
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Figure A.36.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.10
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Figure A.37.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.11
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Figure A.38.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.12
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Figure A.39.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.13
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Figure A.40.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.14
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Figure A.41.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.15
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Figure A.42.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.16
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Figure A.43.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.17
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Figure A.44.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.18
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Figure A.45.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.19
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Figure A.46.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.20
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Figure A.47.: The Oracle Machine, 2009. Picture series 2.21
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A.5. Patch
Figure A.48.: Noisez patch
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Figure A.49.: Example of cabalistic noise generator
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Figure A.50.: The Uncertainty video effect
A.6. Code
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A.7 Disclaimer
Search for word where word is something given by user interrogating.
Use a pseudo random seed ’n’ derived from the time of execution of the program
10 Pick the word which is in the nth result google hit, nth word in the resulting
page
20 Get the new word and add it to the list
Do we have n amount of words?
If true GOT0 50 ELSE
40 GOTO 10
50 Try to make a sentence out of these words with NLTK15 (never worked perfectly)
60 END
A.7. Disclaimer
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
Wittgenstein (1921:89)
15Natural Language Toolkit.
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